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Case No. 20091086-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Samuel Marlin King,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated kidnapping (domestic
violence), a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West
Supp. 2010) and § 77-36-1 (West Supp. 2008), and aggravated assault (domestic
violence), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West
2004) and § 77-36-1. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0 (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendant presents three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and seeks
reversal of his convictions or, alternatively, reconsideration of his failed remand
motion under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The first two claims
were included in his original remand motion.
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1. A. Should this Court strike Defendant's first two claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel where they rest on non-record evidence attached to his briefs
addendum?
l.B. Should this Court reconsider and deny Defendant's unsuccessful rule
23B motion where he includes no new allegations of nonrecord facts which would
warrant a remand?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to these issues.
2. Was Defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not objecting
to admission of a witness's prior inconsistent out-of-court statements to police and
her subsequent allegedly coerced statements to police?
Standard of Review. Defendant's claims are raised for the first time on appeal
and, hence, present a question of law. See State v. Ott, 2010 UT1, \ 16,

P.3d

cert denied, 131 S. Ct 1472 (2011).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 801, Utah Rules of
Evidence, are attached in Addendum A.
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,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant with aggravated kidnapping, a first degree
felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R. 1A-1B,
Defendant moved for access to the victim's records from Valley Mental
Health. R. 30-31. He later filed an amended motion seeking the victim's mental
health records from the Storefront and Safe Haven programs as well as records
involving her medications. R. 33-34. After the State objected, Defendant submitted
another motion seeking an order compelling Valley Mental Health to produce
records concerning the victim's diagnosis and treatment with regard to probation
for a May 2007 assault conviction. R. 43-47, 50-51. The motion also sought
information about medication prescribed for the victim by a specific podiatrist and
bank records from the victim's bank. R. 50-51. The motion alleged that the
requested information was relevant to the defense because "it relates to [the
victim's] credibility [.]" Id. The State objected to this additional motion, arguing that
the records were privileged and they did not contain exculpatory evidence favorable
to Defendant. R. 54-60. The court sought additional briefing and scheduled oral
argument. R. 64-66; R. 148:4-8.
Three weeks later, Defendant filed a motion asking the court to strike oral
argument and set the case for a pre-trial conference. R. 67-68. Defense counsel
"3"
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explained that his additional research into the governing statutory and case law
revealed that the defense would be "unable to meet the admissibility requirements
regarding the alleged victims [sic] medical and bank recordsf.]" R. 67; R. 149:3. The
judge executed the proposed order submitted by defense counsel, and the matter
proceeded to trial. R. 69, 70-95.
Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant as charged. R. 96-98.
The judge ordered a presentence investigation report to ensure he did not miss any
mitigating factors that might bear on the mandatory sentencing requirements for the
aggravating kidnapping conviction. R. 152:192-93. Ultimately, the judge could not
find an appropriate mitigating factor to warrant a downward departure. R. 153:1213. Consequently, he sentenced Defendant to concurrent indeterminate prison
terms of fifteen years to life for aggravated kidnapping and zero to five years for
aggravated assault; he ran the terms consecutive to the commitment Defendant was
already serving at the time. R. 153:13.
Defendant timely appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court poured the matter
over to this Court. R. 126-28,133-36,145.
Before filing his opening brief, Defendant filed a motion under rule 23B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking a remand to explore his claims of ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel. The motion claimed that Defendant's "trial counsel
4
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was ineffective in failing to obtain an expert witness and failing to discover medical
records." See Order Denying Remand (attached in Addendum B). Defendant
submitted with his motion two affidavits purporting to allege "facts not fully
appearing in the record on appeal" and to demonstrate the claimed ineffectiveness.
See Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). In denying the motion, this Court held that it was
"properly supported with affidavits and otherwise well-presented," but that it failed
to meet the prejudice requirement for a remand because the information sought by
the motion amounted to "cumulative impeachment evidence regarding the victim's
general credibility," which was "not likely to have resulted in a different outcome"
in light of the remaining evidence supporting the victim's testimony. See Order
Denying Remand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Players:
Pam Westphal has been homeless for much of her adult life and has struggled
with mental and drug-related problems. R. 152:4-6. She was diagnosed with
depression and meth-induced psychosis as well as post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), the last of which arose after Pam was the victim of a robbery while working
at a convenience store. R. 152:5-7. As a result, Pam has been taking Zoloft for
several years to help with depression and Trazodone to help with sleep. R. 152:5-6.
5
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In September of 2008, Pam received a lump-sum disability payment of $26,000
from the social security administration. R. 152:7-8,10. She immediately deposited
the money in a bank account in her name. R. 152:11. Over the course of several
weeks, she spent some of the money on drugs and alcohol. R. 152:49,59. She also
gave a lot of it away. She gave some to her kids, some to a woman who had helped
her out over the years, and some to "a lot" of homeless people she ran into. R.
152:10-11,61. Among the latter was a homeless "pregnant girl" at the park that Pam
"gave money to almost every other day." R. 152:61.
Pam also gave money to Defendant. R. 152:9. Pam and Defendant were alike
in many ways. Both were homeless at various times, both drank, both smoked crack
cocaine, and both spent their days at Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City or around the
homeless shelters. R. 125:6; R. 151:93-94,112; R. 152:4,13-15,45,49, 52-53,130; R.
153:3. Pam first met Defendant in 2007 at the homeless shelter near Pioneer Park. R.
152:4-5. Pam had been homeless for about six months at the time. R. 152:5. The two
became romantically involved and moved in together in early 2008. Id. It was only
after Pam received the lump-sum payment in September, however, that the violence
began. R. 152:12. Defendant started asking Pam to buy him things and began
"harping on her" about it. R. 152:9-10. He wanted her to put the money into his
bank account, and he got mad when she gave the money to other people. R.
6
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151:195; R. 152:11,136. Pam spent about $2,000 on Defendant, and ultimately gave
him $5,000, hoping that would satisfy him. R. 152:9,11-12. It did not. Instead,
Defendant became increasingly angry and 'Very violent" with Pam. R. 151:196; R.
152:12. He began "hitting" her, and at one point, picked her up by the throat and
started to strangle her. R. 152:12. Diana Miller, a longtime friend of Pam's, saw
some of the "bruises" that Pam suffered during the time of the abuse. R. 151:202.
Defendant's violence after he received the $5,000 prompted Pam to move out,
even though she had nowhere to go and had to leave some of her things behind. R.
152:11-14. When she was able to return for some of them, she had her friend Diana
accompany her to Defendant's apartment because she was "frightened of him[.]" R,
151:192; R. 152:12.
Like Pam and the Defendant, Jackie Juarez drank, did drugs, and hung out at
Pioneer Park. R. 151:92-93,172. Jackie had known Defendant for more than ten
years, believed him to be "a very intelligent man[,]"described him as her
"brother[,]" and called herself his sister or his buddy. R. 151:88, 94, 100, 135.
Despite this close relationship, she claimed she had not been to Defendant's
apartment before September 25, 2008, and did not know before that time that
Defendant and Pam had lived together. R. 151:102-03,118,131. Jackie had not

7
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known Pam long and did not like her. R. 151:100-01,129-30,132. But she knew
about Pam's money. R. 151:102.
The Kidnapping and Assault:
On September 25, 2008, Pam spent much of the day at Pioneer Park, as had
Defendant. R. 151:126-28; R. 152:14-15. Defendant spent the day drinking Vodka
with Jackie and his friends at the park. R. 151:93; R. 152:23. During the day, Pam
smoked crack cocaine and drank a little vodka, sharing a pint with several other
people. R. 152:15,38. Jackie did the same. R. 151:93. After it got dark, Pam was
looking for her boyfriend when Jackie approached her from behind and wrapped an
electrical cord around her throat. R. 152:16. As Jackie held the cord in place, Pam
heard Defendant telling Jackie what to do. R. 152:16.
Defendant and Jackie walked Pam to a nearby picnic table, securing her to the
table with the cord. R. 152:18-19. Defendant was angry with Pam, complaining that
she had been "disrespecting him" and repeatedly telling her that he was going to
kill her. R. 152:18, 22, 25. Defendant called a cab and, as they waited, hit Pam
several times in the back of the head. R. 152:21-22. When another of his friends,
Alaska, tried to hit Pam, Jackie stood in front of Pam to prevent it. R. 152:22. As the
cab arrived, Jackie told Pam not to say anything to the driver, and Defendant
threatened to kill her if she did. R. 152:23.
8
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The cab dropped Defendant, Pam, and Jackie at Defendant's apartment where
Defendant continued to threaten to kill Pam. R. 152:27-28, 33-34. At one point,
Defendant threatened to burn Pam with a cigarette. R. 151:117. At another, he
threatened to cut out her tongue, going so far as to heat the blade of a knife on the
kitchen stove. R. 152:32-33. The resulting smoke set off the smoke alarm. Id.
Defendant set aside the knife to deal with the alarm and never acted on the threat.
R. 152:33.
Throughout the evening, Defendant repeatedly told Pam that they would take
her to the bank the next morning so that she could withdraw the rest of her money
and give it to him. R. 152:28-29,33-34. Eventually, Defendant handed Jackie a roll
of black duct tape and told her to tie Pam up with it because "that bitch likes to run"
and "might wander off in the night. R. 151:118; R. 152:30. Jackie used the tape to
bind Pam's wrists snugly together behind her back and to put her ankles together.
R. 152:30-31. Defendant and Jackie continued to drink Vodka for three to four
hours, during which time Defendant tried to force Pam to drink. R. 152:32,34-35.
Defendant finally went to his bedroom and fell asleep. R. 152:34-35. Jackie fell
asleep on a futon in the living room, leaving Pam on the floor. R. 151:114,150-51; R.
152:34-35.

9
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Throughout the ordeal, Pam believed that Defendant might follow through
on his death threats. R. 152:26. She was "scared to death" and unable to sleep, so
that she worked with the duct tape binding her. R. 152:35. Eventually, she found a
loose end and released her hands. R. 152:36. She then unbound her feet and left
through the front door. R. 152:36. She could not run due to an old injury, but
walked as fast as she could to a Maverik convenience store three to five blocks away
and dialed 911. R. 151:75; R. 152:36.
The Investigation:
When Officer Folau of the Salt Lake City Police Department arrived at the
Maverick on North Temple in response to Pam's 4:30 a.m. call, he found a
distraught Pam with black duct tape wrapped tightly around each of her wrists and
ankles. R. 151:59. He spoke briefly with her, then went to Defendant's apartment.
R. 151:62. Finding the door wide open and seeing Jackie asleep in the living room,
he pounded on the door and announced himself. R. 151:63-64, 75. Jackie woke up
and invited him in. R. 151:64, 75. As he entered, he saw a roll of black duct tape in
plain view by the sofa where Jackie had been sleeping. R. 151:64. He found
Defendant asleep in his bedroom with the door open and—in plain view—a number
of knives, including a knife with a white handle matching the description given by

10
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Pam. R. 151:66-69. He also found "many, many, many cords" in the apartment. R.
151:70,143.
Detective Hillary Gordon, who worked with the domestic violence unit of the
Salt Lake City Police Department, interviewed the relevant players. R. 152:110-13.
She interviewed Pam the morning of September 26 and again about a week later. At
this first interview, the detective did not know what had happened and had talked
to no one else about the incident. R. 152:113-14. She found Pam to be "very volatile
emotionally" and "kind of shell shocked[.]" R. 152:114. Pam was visibly upset and
wanted the duct tape removed quickly. R. 152:114-16. As the crime lab worker
removed it, Pam quipped, "that girl's fingerprints are on here [the tape], and I want
her to pay[.]"l R. 152:151-52. Throughout the first interview, Pam would cry, talk
and respond to questions, and periodically exclaim something like, "Oh, my gosh,
I'm going to be in trouble[.]" R. 152:114. Although distraught, Pam was able to
communicate "fairly decent[ly,]" track the conversation, and answer questions
appropriately. R. 152:122-24,151. When she went off on a tangent, the detective
was able to direct her back to the discussion easily. R. 152:151.

1

Although the crime lab obtained prints from the tape, none were sufficient to
permit any comparison. R. 151:120-21.
11
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Because Pam was "absolutely terrified of going back" to the shelter and had
no where else to go, victim advocates tried, without success, to find a place for her.
R. 152:122-23. Unwilling to put her back on the streets immediately, they chose to
put her in a detoxification unit that had an empty bed. R. 152:123.
About a week later, Pam sought out Detective Gordon to find out the status of
the case and whether Defendant and Jackie had been released. R. 152:123. Pam was
afraid the two might get out of jail and come to kill her. R. 152:123. By then, the
detective had received and reviewed Officer Folau's report and wanted to clarify a
couple of things with Pam. R. 152:123,142. Pam had originally said that a black
cord had been wrapped around her neck, but Officer Folau retrieved a white cord
from the scene. R. 152:123-24,142. Pam insisted it was black and maintained as
much when asked again by Detective Gordon. R. 152:123-24,142. Additionally,
Pam originally reported to the detective that Defendant held a knife to her side
during the cab ride but when asked again, she said that Defendant did not use a
knife in the cab. R. 152:124,140-41.
Detective Gordon also interviewed Defendant and Jackie the morning they
were arrested. R. 152:124-25. Defendant refused to answer any questions about the
knife. R. 152:131. He admitted to smoking crack the day of the incident, but made

12
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no other admissions and claimed that Pam "was crazy" and must have duct taped
herself. R. 152:131,149.
The detective found Jackie in handcuffs because she had been "mouthy" to
the officers watching her and they opted not to take them off. R. 152:125. The
detective removed the cuffs, hoping it would help with the interview. R. 152:125-26.
She found Jackie to be "very difficult" to talk to because she was a talker who talked
in circles, would not give straight answers, and took things back. R. 152:125-26.
Jackie said that Defendant invited Pam to the apartment to get the rest of her
things and that Pam went only after Jackie assured her that she would go with her.
R. 152:127-28. Jackie confirmed that Defendant and Alaska tried to hit Pam at the
park, but claimed that she stopped them because she could not stand to watch a
woman beat down. R. 152:128. She also confirmed that Defendant "was f-ing with
that bitch [referring to Pam], and he was scaring her." R. 152:129. When asked who
taped Pam, Jackie did not answer directly, but said that Defendant told her that Pam
liked to roam in the middle of the night. R. 152:129-30. Like Defendant, Jackie also
refused to answer any questions about the knife. R. 152:130.
The detective interviewed Jackie a second time because she thought that
Jackie was more of a talker than Defendant. R. 152:131-32. She spoke with Jackie at
the county jail, taking the approach of "bluffing her quite a bit. . . trying to see if
13
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[Jackie] was going to give . . . any more information, or if she was just going to
continue to talk in circles." R. 152:131-32. No charges had yet been filed, so the two
discussed possible charges, and the detective stated that the district attorney's office
would give Jackie a deal, despite the fact that the officer had no authority to offer a
deal. R. 152:133-34. The detective also told Jackie that Defendant "had rolled on"
her when he had not. R. 152:133. This ultimately prompted Jackie to comment, "I
thought we were going to ride this out together. We talked about this. We were
going to ride it out together." R. 152:156.
During the second interview, Jackie admitted that at the time of the incident,
she knew about Pam's money, knew that Defendant wanted it, knew that Defendant
"was enraged" at Pam because she was giving money away to other people and was
sleeping with someone else. R. 152:134-36. Jackie believed that without her
presence, Defendant might have killed Pam. Id. Jackie still did not admit to taping
Pam's arms and legs, but when Detective Gordon lied and said that Defendant's
prints were found on the tape taken off Pam, Jackie asked, "Well, what if my
fingerprints come back on that tape?" R. 152:136-37. She repeatedly noted that she
"should have stayed out of it. " R. 152:155.

14
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After filing an unsuccessful motion for a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Defendant now argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in several ways. First, he presents the same issues he raised in
his rule 23B motion: his counsel's alleged failure to properly investigate Pam's
mental state and the need for a mental health expert and to properly request
discovery of Pam's mental health files. Then he presents a new claim of ineffective
assistance: his counsel's failure to object to the admission of Jackie's statements
given at two pre-trial police interviews. Additionally, he seeks reversal of his
convictions or, alternatively, a remand for an evidentiary hearing under rule 23B.
Merits review of Defendant's two mental health claims is not warranted, and
this Court should strike not only the non-record affidavits attached to his brief, but
also the arguments, which rely heavily on the affidavits. The very absence of a
record-based argument demonstrates that the appellate record does not support
these two claims of error.
Defendant's request for reconsideration of the rule 23B motion should be
denied because he provides no new nonspeculative allegation of nonrecord facts
upon which to base a reconsideration. The requirement is not met by mere citation
to additional publications and authorities. Neither is it met by Defendant's new
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ineffective assistance claim challenging counsel's failure to object to the admission
of evidence. The new claim may be reviewed on the appellate record before this
Court and decided without regard to the merits of Defendant's mental health
claims.
Finally, Defendant's trial counsel did not perform objectively unreasonably by
not objecting to the admission of Jackie's statements made in the two pre-trial police
interviews. First, the statements from the first interview were inconsistent with the
witness' trial testimony, thereby permitting their use under rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah
Rules of Evidence. Thus, an objection raised by Defendant's trial counsel would
have been futile.
Second, defense counsel actively used the detective's interview tactics and the
witness' statements from the second interview to undermine the integrity of the
State's evidence and the reliability of the police investigation. Consequently, the
lack of an objection to the evidence was a matter of reasonable trial strategy. In any
event, even absent the evidence from the second interview, the remaining evidence,
including Jackie's prior inconsistent statements from the first interview, provide
ample support for the jury's decision, defeating Defendant's claim.
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ARGUMENTS
I.
DEFENDANTS CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
RELATING TO THE VICTIM'S MENTAL STATE AND MENTAL
HEALTH FILES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN; EVEN IF THE ARGUMENTS
ARE VIEWED AS A RENEWED RULE 23B MOTION, THEY
SHOULD BE DENIED
Defendant claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently by:
(1) not properly investigating the victim's mental state before trial and
not using an expert witness to educate the jury as to her mental state;
(2) not making a proper request for discovery of Pam's mental health
files; and
(3) not objecting to testimony from Detective Gordon concerning outof-court statements made by Jackie Juarez during her two police
interviews.
Aplt. Br. at 1,13-44. Defendant, however, does not merely seek a review of his
claims on the merits and a reversal of his conviction. Instead, he asks this Court to
reconsider his failed Rule 23B motion, urging this Court to "reassess" his ineffective
assistance claims "in the context of the entire appeal" and asking that he be granted
a remand to supplement the record with additional evidence. See id. at 6 n.l, 11,50.
He also asserts that he is attempting to preserve his arguments for presentation to
the Utah Supreme Court in a petition for writ of certiorari should his appeal fail in
this Court. See id.
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Only the first two of Defendant's three ineffective assistance claims were
asserted in his initial rule 23B motion. His arguments on both those claims, together
with the two supporting affidavits attached to his brief, should be stricken because
the affidavits are not part of the appellate record, and the arguments are wholly
dependent on the affidavits.
Should this Court reconsider Defendant's rule 23B motion in light of the
arguments in his brief, it should affirm its earlier denial of the motion where the
additional allegations advanced by Defendant do not warrant a different outcome.
Finally, the lack of an objection to the admission of Jackie's pre-trial interview
statements does not amount to deficient performance where the statements from the
first interview were properly admitted, thereby rendering any objection futile, and
where the statements from the second interview were used by defense counsel in
furtherance of a reasonable trial strategy.
A. To the Extent that Defendant's First Two Claims of Ineffective
Assistance Present Substantive Arguments, They Should be
Stricken
Defendant's first two arguments involve allegations of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel for (1) not adequately investigating and developing expert testimony
on Pam's mental state and (2) not making a proper request for Pam's mental health
files. See Aplt. Br. at 14-32. Defendant includes these arguments to permit this
18
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Court to "reassess" his earlier request for a rule 23B remand.

See id. at 6, n.l.

However, he also seeks a ruling on the merits of his ineffective assistance claims: he
states the issues in terms of standard substantive ineffective assistance of counsel
claims and references only the legal standard for such claims and not the
requirements for consideration of a rule 23B motion. See id. at 2, 6-7 n.l, 11-14.
To the extent that this Court views Defendant's arguments as advancing
substantive claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it should strike these first
two claims and their supporting affidavits because the arguments rely almost
exclusively on the affidavits, which are non-record evidence.
Defendant asserted the first two of his three claims of ineffective assistance in
his unsuccessful rule 23B motion. See Memorandum in Support of 23B Motion to
Remand ["Memo"] (attached in Addendum C); Order Denying Remand. In
keeping with rule 23B, he submitted with his motion two affidavits purporting to
allege "facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal" and to demonstrate the
2

Defendant claims that rule 23B "does not preclude" renewal of a rule 23B
motion in the opening brief on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 6, n.l. However, neither does
it permit presentation of a rule 23B motion within the opening brief.
Rather, the rule provides that a remand motion "shall be filed prior to the
filing of the appellant's brief" or, "[u]pon a showing of good cause, . . . after the
filing of the appellant's brief." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). However, the rule goes on
to provide that this Court may remand under the rule "on its own motion at any
time" if the claim was raised and the motion would have been available. Id.
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claimed ineffectiveness. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). This Court held that although
the motion was "properly supported with affidavits and otherwise well-presented/'
it failed to meet the prejudice requirement for a remand:
[t]he additional proposed testimony and records are cumulative
impeachment evidence regarding the victim's general credibility. Such
additional evidence is not likely to have resulted in a different
outcome. The victim's testimony was supported by other testimony,,
and it is the jury's province to determine credibility and the weight to
give a witness's testimony.
See Order Denying Remand.
Defendant's opening brief presents the same two issues and includes in the
addendum the same two non-record affidavits originally submitted in support of
the remand motion. See Aplt. Br. at 14-32 & Add. C & E. His arguments as to these
claims rely on and pervasively cite to the affidavits. See id. Use of the nonrecord
information is not relegated to footnotes or to a separate, severable paragraph. In
fact, Defendant fails to present any argument as to these two claims that is based
solely on the appellate record before this Court. In essence, he concedes by this
omission that the appellate record does not support either of his substantive claims.
It is well-settled that affidavits submitted in support of a motion to remand
cannot be used as substantive evidence to support an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998)
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(refusing to allow Bredehoft to rely upon "unsubstantiated allegations [from a rule
23B affidavit] on appeal as proof of ineffective assistance of counsel" and striking
the affidavit and all references to it in Bredehoft's brief); see also Low v. Bonacci, 788
P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990) (appellate courts "do not consider new evidence on
appeal"). Accordingly, both affidavits and all references thereto in Defendant's
opening brief must be stricken. See Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 290. Given Defendant's
pervasive reliance on these affidavits in his first two arguments, there would remain
no claim of substantive error for this Court to review.
B. This Court Should Refuse to Reconsider the Renewed Rule 23B
Motion
Defendant expressly seeks reconsideration of his rule 23B motion, asking this
Court to "reassess" his claims "in the context of the entire appeal." Aplt. Br. at 6,
n.l. This Court should refuse the request because Defendant's arguments do not
justify reconsideration of his motion.
A remand is available under rule 23B " only upon a nonspeculative allegation
of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a
determination that counsel was ineffective." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). To obtain
reconsideration of a rule 23B motion, Defendant must present some new
"'nonspeculative allegation of facts'" meeting the specifications of the rule. See State
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v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 26,186 P.3d 1023 (refusing to reconsider the
denial of earlier rule 23B motion absent presentation of new "'nonspeculative
allegation of facts'") (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B(a)), cert denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah
2008).
Here, reconsideration is not appropriate because Defendant presents no new
nonspeculative allegation of facts in support of his reconsideration request. His
argument concerning defense counsel's request for Pam's mental health records
includes no new factual allegations beyond that contained in the original rule 23B
remand motion. Compare Aplt. Br. at 25-32 with Memo at 32-41. Defendant merely
restates the same argument already addressed by this Court. Id.
Defendant's complaint that his trial counsel failed to investigate Pam's mental
state and to call a mental health expert includes additional citations, but no new
nonspeculative allegation of facts. The brief repeats the allegation from the original
motion that research demonstrates that someone with a history of drug use "likely
has significantly impaired cognitive processes." Aplt. Br. at 15-18 (holding and
initial capitalization removed); Memo at 18-22.

It then reiterates the same

supporting argument with the addition of citations to various articles, treatises, and
reports detailing the adverse effects of methamphetamine use. See Aplt. Br. at 16-18.
Defendant's earlier motion included the same essential argument supported instead
22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the affidavit of Defendant's proposed expert. Compare Aplt. Br. at 15-18 (citing
articles, treatises and reports) with Memo at 18-20 (relying on the expert affidavit
filed in support of the motion). The remainder of the argument in both the brief and
the memorandum involves the proposed expert's ability to assist the jury in
evaluating Pam's testimony. Compare Aplt. Br. at 20-24 with Memo at 25-31. In
other words, Defendant presents the same basic argument to this Court, albeit with
citations to different authority, without reference to any additional "nonspeculative
allegation of facts." Hence, reconsideration is not warranted See Chavez-Espinoza,
2008 UT App 191, f 26.
Similarly, Defendant's third ineffective

assistance claim lacks the

nonspeculative allegations of facts necessary for reconsideration. Defendant claims
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to Detective
Gordon's recitation of Jackie's responses in her two pre-trial police interviews. See
Aplt. Br. at 32-50. The argument is designed to address this Court's earlier rejection
of the rule 23B motion based on its assessment that the additional mental health
evidence sought by Defendant would amount only to "cumulative impeachment
evidence," which was "not likely to have resulted in a different outcome" given the
existence of "other testimony" supporting the victim's testimony. Order Denying
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Remand. The third claim seeks to undermine some of the "other testimony"
referenced by this Court. Id.
The claim does not justify reconsideration of the rule 23B motion because it
fails to present any new "nonspeculative allegation of facts [] not fully appearing in
the record on appealf.]" Utah R. App. P. 23B(a); see also Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT
App 191,1 26. In fact, the claim has no bearing on whether a remand under rule
23B is warranted. The claim may be entirely reviewed and decided on the present
appellate record without the need for a remand. If the record demonstrates the
claimed ineffectiveness, the conviction will be reversed and the case remanded
independent of Defendant's mental health-related claims, without the need for a
rule 23B remand. If the record does not demonstrate ineffectiveness, then the claim
fails, leaving this Court's prejudice analysis in its previous order unchanged. In
either case, the new claim is irrelevant to whether a remand under rule 23B is
appropriate.
Accordingly, Defendant's arguments fail to provide any basis on which to
reconsider this Court's ruling on the previous remand motion. This Court should

3

As explained in Point II, below, the record does not support the new claim of
ineffective assistance.
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thus refuse Defendant's reconsideration request. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App
191, f 26.
II.
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF A WITNESS'S
STATEMENTS FROM TWO PRE-TRIAL INTERVIEWS WHERE
AN OBJECTION TO THE STATEMENTS FROM THE FIRST
INTERVIEW WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE, AND WHERE
COUNSEL HAD A STRATEGIC REASON FOR ADMITTING
THE STATEMENTS FROM THE SECOND INTERVIEW
Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for
not objecting to the admission of testimony from Detective Gordon concerning
Jackie Juarez's statements made during two police interviews. See Aplt. Br. at 32-50.
Defendant argues that the statements from the first interview were inadmissible
under rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence, because they were not inconsistent
with Jackie's in-court testimony. See id. at 37-39. He contends that the statements
from the second interview were inadmissible because of Detective Gordon's
coercive interview techniques. See id. at 39-43. Defendant claims that his trial
counsel's failure to object to this testimony amounted to deficient performance, and
that the admission of the evidence resulted in prejudice. See id. at 43-50.
Contrary to his arguments, the statements from the first interview were in fact
admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(A) as inconsistent out-of-court statements, thereby
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rendering any objection to their admission futile. Counsel cannot be deemed
deficient for failing to raise futile objections. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26,1
P.3d 546. With respect to the statements from the second interview, defense counsel
had a reasonable strategic reason for admitting those statements. In any event, they
did not result in prejudice.
A. The Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that trial
counsel's performance was deficient—that is, counsel's performance did not meet
an objective standard of reasonableness —by identifying the specific acts or
omissions he alleges did not result from reasonable professional judgment.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690 (1984). Defendant must also show
that "'counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial/" in that there is "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.'" Id. at 687,694. A reasonable probability is
one that undermines confidence in the outcome. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,
187 (Utah 1990). The showing of prejudice must be a "demonstrable reality and not
a speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (quotation
omitted). Moreover, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections.
See Kelley, 2000 UT 41,1 26; State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, f 31,248 P.3d 984.
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With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must 'indulge in
the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy."' State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,542 (Utah App. 1998)
(quotations and citations omitted); State v, Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 58, 61 P.3d
291 (holding no deficient performance where counsel's action may be the result of a
tactical choice). This standard is appropriately deferential, recognizing the "variety
of circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,
1254 (Utah 1993). In keeping with this, Defendant must prove that there is no
conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. See King, 2010 UT App 396, ^ 31.
Absent such proof, Defendant cannot demonstrate deficient performance. See State
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, If 7, 89 P.3d 162; Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 58.
In short, a "defendant is not guaranteed successful assistance of counsel," nor
is a defendant entitled to relief merely by asserting that his counsel's "performance
could have been better," or even that it "might have contributed to his conviction."
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258 (quotations and citation omitted). Instead, a defendant's
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"constitutional right entitles him only to effective assistance of counsel, not to the
best or most complete representation available/7 Id.
B. Statements from Jackie's first interview were admissible,
thereby making an objection futile
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten . . . .
Defendant first argues that the statements Jackie made at her first interview
with Detective Gordon were inadmissible hearsay under this rule because they were
not inconsistent with her trial testimony. See Aplt. Br. 37-39. On the contrary, not
only were the statements inconsistent, but Jackie testified that she did not remember
making some of them.
Detective Gordon testified that during the first interview, Jackie made the
following statements:
—Defendant wanted Pam to come to the apartment to get the rest of her
clothes (R. 152:127);
—Pam was afraid to go to Defendant's apartment (R. 152:128);
-Defendant was trying to hit Pam while they were at the park (R. 152:128);
-Defendant "was f-ing with that bitch [Pam], and he was scaring her" while
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they were at the apartment (R. 1"2-"129V
See also Aplt. Br. at 37, The detective also tesuiitu v. •
-when asked UPOUI ine auct tape, jauac ^voidcu tut>w ^ ,;.^ L,,<.
question of who taped Pam and mere:}7 said that Defendant void r.M; *:Ml
Pam "lib'vl t,* — n - :- 'h^midd 1 - ^f^" night" (R l^-'PQ-^O) -* .
J ackie refused to an si v er when asked about Defendant having a
i *:t* /D ico.ian\
jK, I | I I_C

" I.\.

! \* f(

li,

MM.

See also Aplt. Br. at 37.
Although Defendant claims that all of these statements were consistent with
Jackie's testimony, see Aplt. Br. at 3/ -39, her testimony, in ~u i. d, • lorea sij;:i^: ^

./

on these points:
—] ackie testified that she did not remember telling Detective Gordon that it
was Defendant who wanted Pam,,., to go to the apartment to get her clothes (R.
151:173); that she invited Pam,, to go to the apartment when she discovered
that Pam had nowhere to sleep that night, but that Defendant "didn't
want her to go" (R. 151:109-10, 1 1 8,1,33-34,1,38-39; 1,61,164,185);4 that she did
not know' at that time that Pam had lived at the apartment and still had
• clothes there (R. 151:133-34);
—Jackie testined that Pam wanted to go to UIL
afraid that Defendant was mad at her (R. 1 rl 1

leni, u u u i - : .
- - 141. ^ ^

—Jackie could not remember if she had to stop Defendant from hitting Pam at
the park, but testified, that if he had, wanted to hit Pam, Jackie could, not have
stopped him, (R. 151:107,134-35); later she testified that Defendant did not try

kie reiterated at least nine times in her testimony at trial uiai
d i d n o t w a n t P a m togo iolheaparimr-f R *~--io- - i ; 1"3-?4, - 1
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:

teienaant

to hit Pam at the park (R. 151:161);
-Jackie remembered that Defendant and Pam argued at the apartment, but
testified that Defendant did not threaten Pam (R. 151:115,148); later she
testified that Defendant threatened to burn Pam with his cigarette (R.
151:117);
-Jackie initially denied taping Pam, denied that Defendant taped Pam, and
claimed she did not remember Pam being taped or Defendant gaving her
ULlC t u u v ^ V*"*-* A c / A . A A W , i u J l / j a L i x i C : i u l C i

\,\ZO Lii.lv: UL

i l i i U v i . tv/ i^'v,

i. l " I

V v I l U iCi.L/"wl

Pam because Defendant "was in the back room" (R. 151:119); she then
testified that she had already admitted taping Pam when the prosecutor first
asked the question (R. 151:119-20,153); finally, she testified that she did not
remember taping Pam but "it had to be" her, she was drunk, and she did it
because Pam would not shut up (R. 151:153-56); and
-Jackie testified that Defendant had a knife at the apartment, but that he
merely gave it to Pam to clean her dirty fingernails (R. 151:111,166-67).
Detective Gordon explained at trial that Jackie was "[v]ery difficult to talk to"
because she tended to "talkQ in circles[.]" R. 152:126. She explained that Jackie
"says one thing and then takes it back and then goes around in a different circle and
just talks in circles over and over." R. 152:126. Jackie's trial testimony amply
demonstrated this tendency.
In light of the fact that each of the challenged interview statements are
inconsistent with testimony given by Jackie at trial, and that Jackie claimed not to
remember some of the statements, all of the challelnged statements were admissible
under rule 801(d)(1)(A). Because an objection based on the rule would have been
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futile, trial counsel did not perform deficiently for not objecting. Defendant's claim
of ineffective assistance for not objecting to the statem ents from, the first interview,
therefore, necessarily iaub. -^ i.cmy . *,:

If 26 ( Fai lure to :i 'ai; • * f il He

objections does i lot coi istit ute ii leffecti \ ? e assistance of coi n isel ')

' • .

i., I lei'i'inist i minsL'l m a d e Ilk" strategic d e c i s i o n t o u s e t h e
the State's case
Finally ; D e f e n d a n t argues n >a L . i^ ;: iui. * >unsei: v n a u i v d .; »e;:ec;i\ ^ assistance

w. , ^
used

~i *

-

-^v'-

*•

^

*

J

*i"i.^ "i to* tive

-^v

; rl erview" tactics that rendered Jackie's statements unreliable and

imolanlary.

See id. However, because the record demonstrates thai defense

counsel had a reasonable strategic decision to use both Jackie's statements and the
officer's interviewing techniques to undermine the State s case. Defendant has not
prove*j aeiiciu:.: performance. See Holbei t, 2ilJ()2 [ J I \ p p A 26, i!| [58 (no i neffecti ve
assistance wliere coti nsel's action m ay be theresi :i It of a legitimate tactical choice).
Defendant fails to recognize that this Court has long recognized "'a strong
presumption that counsel acted competently/" State v, Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 49,
55 P.3d 1131 (quoting State r. Qm/dcr. %0 P.2d 351, ^59 (Utah App. 1 - *}\ ™+.
denied, 6o r.J>^ , .^..oian HM. -

^\\i.-.- . . ^snowmgi/.ji .r.ere was : : J _ :i. j*r> * • .:
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legitimate tactical basis for counsel's' actions, . . . [this Court] will not find that
counsel performed ineffectively." Id. (quoting Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359).
Here, the record demonstrates that defense counsel actively used both the
interview statements and Detective Gordon's interview techniques to undermine
the State's case by impeaching the credibility of the testifying officers and
challenging the quality and effectiveness of the State's investigation. Defense
counsel laid the foundation for his argument in his cross-examination of both the
detective and Jackie. He established that the detective believed that she could
legitimately use any interrogation tactic she wanted short of touching, beating, or
berating the individual, and that, in this case, she told Jackie "a bunch of lies"
during the second interview in order to obtain additional information about the
case. R. 152:132-33,149-50. He also had the detective admit that the techniques do
not always produce the truth. R. 152:150. Finally, defense counsel was careful to
establish that Detective Gordon did not speak with Jackie between the second
interview and the day before trial. Id.
When he cross-examined Jackie, defense counsel had her admit not only that
she believed that the detective was lying to her during the second interview, but
also that she lied to the detective in return. R. 151:126,168. Jackie further testified
that Detective Gordon specifically wanted her to implicate Defendant and that she
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ultimately received a deal in which she agreed to testify truthfully at t~;a!
1 51 ;163, 1 86. Accordingly , she explained ir^i Jicr latemonts JL :riai .; \.t J ,..e
interview diiierect because at trial, tiniici ikHli, she \ .is idling line iinuillii vliile she
inlcntiiinally lied during \\\v interview

IR lhl;182-83.

I n his closing ar^timent, defense counsel used that testimony to support his
argument that the State had failed in its burden of proof. After suggesting that the
State failed to give the jury necessary physical evidence and that Officer Folau may
have "manufactured] evidencei.]"' deiensecounsel gave ins interpretation ol the
evidence from Jackie . - \o:;,i .. u ;\ :>. -.
W.-iat ^-rbjecrrve ^iooi is ti^re that Sam taped her [Jackie] up?
I Jone. No prints from Sam, in spite of what the cop told Jackie in an , ,
effort to - I guess . this is [the] thinking., "We'll lie to her and she'll
tell us the truth/' \ crv clover. 1:' vou don't "'trust the police and you
. know they're lving to vou, you're going to lie right back to them. TlieQ
[interview statements] are not sworn statements. This is the first time '
she's ever come into a court under oath and swore to tell the truth.
\ Vhy didn't they know what the truth was? They didn't ask her.
> i'K v ^ L-^i i:« <ai ihe interv iew] and the) " said, Look, look into - •
his eyes. Wo want to get Sam. We'll make you a deal, substantially
reduce these charges. You testify against him." They never found out
•iv ha t she was going to testify to. I i nterviewed her at the jail right after
trial, and I knew what she was going to say. She came in here and she' •'
told you. She told you exactly what she told me months ago.
[T]hey
subpoenaed this witness - and then they have to impeach her because
tney don't know what she's going to say because they didn't bother to
v.^terview her to find out "what her truth was. ' •
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She was given a Class A Misdemeanor off a 1st Degree and a 3rd
Degree Felony. That's a pretty good deal. She went to jail for a few
months. But she told me and she told you that she was going to tell the
truth. They thought that the truth was already told, but they never
interviewed her again until just yesterday morning, a year later. Didn't
know what she was going to say.
They bring in this witness that embarrasses them, and they have
to impeach her—impeach their own witness because they don't know
what she's going to say. They don't know what her truth is. They
didn't do any investigation. They didn't find anything. They didn't
bring anything to you, and they want you to convict my client on the
basis of what this woman, who has admitted to lying to a cop,
admitted that she's got all kinds of problems, that she's all drugged up,
she's still using, still.
R. 152:166-67,107-71,173-74.. Still later, he argued:
. . . [Jackie] admitted what she did, and yeah, she got a good deal
because the State dropped the ball. They didn't investigate anything.
They didn't talk to her. They just assumed that, "We're going to get
Sam, and you're going to help us." She says, "Sure, fine," but they
never asked her, "Then what are you going to say" until yesterday
when she surprised them, because she told the truth that they never
bothered to find out. So they come in here and they have to attack her,
too, their own witness.
So she didn't come in here because she's immune to further
prosecution. She came in here because she felt an obligation to tell you
the truth. This is the first time she's had the opportunity to do that,
and that's what she did, and she took responsibility for what she did,
and she served her time for it.
In their rush to convict Sam, they said, "We'll make you a deal.
Great. You're out of here." Then... [yesterday] they come in and say,
"Oh, by the way, what are you going to say to me?" The State didn't
want to hear it because they were determined to get Sam, but [Jackie]
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• told the truth that Sam had nothing to do r\ vith taping her [Pam],
detaining'her or threatening her
The conclusion - they jump to conclusions. "Y ou can't do that. •
You're the jury. You're not cops. You have to have proof to guide you
and reinforce you and confirm your decision all the way through.
R. 152:179-80.
Defense counsel" s closing argument ^emonstrare::
< *. L'-yi r\L<" »+ »/ »>"• t

"I 1

"' > '^"* v»"v-» f |,"i -*1- :

U L ' j c t L i l I'll L'U .;: t a i c i i L c i i L o

sludgy

-1 t" VI "» |

4 1i n

J i XJI J i u it,

*

•

M. * - « , . <

*

»-*

i

'

.

.
.

>

* •,

^ c . <*
*w

.

*

*

i
i I

i

Defense \ linns '1 made the legitimate strategic choice to actively use the

information to undermine the State's investigation and the reliability and credibility
of its evidence. As such, the choice represents "a legitimate decision[] regarding
how best to represent" Defendant and does not demonstrate ineffective assistance.
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it demo^iidtes inadequacy of counsel. )

^utdtion omitted). I he fact that the strategy did not I:^ve :he expected re<uit or that
appellate counsel may not agree wiLh it does not establish that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance. :->cc Jarsons, k, 1 i\lc .«; ~~4 (quoting State v. Bullock,
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1991) ("The mere fact that counsel's chosen strategy and tactics did not produce an
acquittal does not compel the conclusion that counsel was ineffective/').
D. Additionally, an objection would have been futile
where the evidence was not coerced, and counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to make a futile
objection
In any event, Jackie's statements from the second interview were not coerced,
thereby rendering any attempt by defense counsel to exclude them on that basis
futile. Whether a statement or confession is coerced or involuntary requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation. See State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,
119,984 P.2d 1009; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,935-36 (Utah 1998). "[T]he evidence
must show that the coercive tactics of the police overcame the defendant's free will."
Gallif 967 P.2d at 936 (citing State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890,893 (Utah 1993)). Relevant
factors include:
•

the duration of the interrogation;

•

the persistence of the officers;

•

police trickery;

•

absence of family and counsel; and

•

threats and promises made by the officers.
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See State v. Montero, ?~~c : T \vp ^5

| 10,191 P.3d 828. The Court must also

consider factors such as " „;eu-ndu;ii s mental health, mental deficiency, emot. ; A
insta bility, eG nation, age, a;..

; miliaria

•

•

. , -v-- *-

.

in lihisidsC; Defivtn v < Iordonc<indidl\ staled In1?* I v lief that she v ;; HT- ^O
11 • 11 i 11J i v i d u a 1 s " a n v n umber of things" during an interrogation to get 'them to talk.
R. 152:132-33. But, in her second interview with Jackie, she misrepresented only
three things in order to get additional information:
• that Defendant "had rolled r r

1

• • llhat Ue-irndant ^ iingerprmivw^ . J , . , on the tape
bound; and
i

her el deal.

/. .

;• . t:.

id been

• •

^ *M r ^ . " \ 49-50. in other words, the detective attempted to lead Jackie
10 believe that the State's case against her was stronger than it really was, and that
she could benefit from telling the detective what really happened among the three
people present at Deiendar.t s apartment.
. J'eternldiil has not established lh.il any of these statements overcame lack le's
*-'-io *•

"^ "

i(

:-^rvi

« .-

,

^ • . ••* .'

,

wt
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and involved

only one detective and Jackie. Nothing suggests that Jackie wras denied any physical
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comfort or convenience, that she was belittled or otherwise disparaged, or that the
detective played on any obvious physical or psychological weaknesses.
Moreover, the record reveals no particular vulnerability or shortcoming that
would make Jackie particularly susceptible to the detective's manipulation. See, e.g.,
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,11 2, 6 (eighteen-year-old defendant had below average
I.Q., maturity level of fifteen-year-old, suffered from attention deficit disorder,
exhibited symptoms of depression, anxiety disorder, thought
schizophrenia, and dependent personality disorder).

disorder,

Defendant claims that

Detective Gordon exploited Jackie's vulnerabilities simply because Jackie "talks in
circles, she was homeless and scared, and she had not been implicated in serious
crime before this case." Aplt. Br. at 41. However, these circumstances are largely
irrelevant in this case. Jackie's tendency to talk in circles was not exploited by the
detective's misrepresentations. The detective simply noted that she interviewed
Jackie because she was more talkative than Defendant, and that when Jackie began
talking in circles, the detective would "direct [Jackie] back to the actual point" under
discussion. R. 152:131-32,150-51.
Neither did either the detective or Jackie recognize that the specifics of the
interview had any impact on Jackie's homelessness. In fact, it was not established
that Jackie was homeless. Similarly, there was no testimony suggesting that Jackie's
38
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past criminal involvement or lack thereof entered into the interview questions or
Jackie's responses.

i .

^%>

.

uul w

j 1 0 " W O u l d not obev am K'dv's orders."'7 R. 151:89; R.

152:172,174. Jackie herself testified that "[n]obody tells [her] what to do" and that
Defendant, specifically, did not tell her A hat io do. P 151 120. Tackie noted that she
was only temporanlv lUiicd . \ IHH-A;, e ^e;,KMi ,- -.^ ^ because she was scare.; py
the prospect of a pi ^ , , \ .. , :.
.*

ifa:e •

•

,

•

•
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-\. a *d
na she

dr-ridcd to lie right back, thus creating for herself an opportunity to obtain a deal
while intending to testify that Defendant had no pari in Panrs detention,

R.

151:168-70; R. 152:173-74. While the detective was not authorized to extend a deal to
Jackie at the time OL iiic second interview, Jackij .;. .ac; received a , :-JIL\ gvod
deal ii i exchange for vv 1: Latsheled tl: i..e detective to belie\ 'e \ vouldbe her testin i ony
a a air * npu>n I -•'

" ~"-'!7^-"" i

•? -

con

fessed efforts to take advantage of the

opportunity to obtain a benefit for herself by lying to 'the detective demonstrates the
exercise of free will.
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Further, while "half-truths regarding the strength of the [State's] evidence
against [an accused] should not be condoned," "'[a] defendant's will is not
overborne simply because he is led to believe that the government's knowledge of
his guilt is greater than it actually is.'" Montero, 2008 UT App 285, \ 16 (quoting
Galli, 967 R2d at 936) (citation omitted).
The totality of the circumstances does not demonstrate coercion in this case
where the only factors suggesting coercion are a misrepresentation as to the strength
of the State's evidence and a statement that a deal would be made.

These

circumstances are not, under the facts at hand, sufficiently coercive to overcome
Jackie's free will. See, e.g., Montero, 2008 UT App 285, f f 12-21 (no coercion where
interrogation was conducted periodically over six-hour period, accused was
handcuffed to his chair, and officers used false-friend technique, made
misrepresentations as to strength of State's case, made statements concerning the
possibility of a deal, and eighteen-year-old accused was not "particularly
susceptible to coercion or manipulation").

Hence, Jackie's statements were

voluntary and not coerced, and an objection to their admission would have been
futile. Consequently, Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness for failing to object to
admission of the statements necessarily fails. See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^f 26.
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E. Even absent' the statements from the second interview,
there is no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome
Moreo\"' Iher" i:- no pwtonahl" probability ol i different result absent the
statements from the second interview; The jury still had before it the testimony of
Officer Folau and Detective Gordon corroborating various parts of Pain's testimony
and her physical and emotional condition thai niejV ! ho photographs cf the duct
tape on Pam; the testimonv of Diana A H ^ ; rcmioiv.ng , .... - '.;VV;.L.:; ; .»/
corroborating =
• .r;
abusi ve tl u

-

,
- K- .-^

.*.*

<

:/

•
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•.: :

.

A

te

Mi Priiii'1- iv< I'ipt nf \\\r m-inry. .inJ Ilia! Defendant

tried repeat?.-4)v to ^et Pam to give him the money; and Jackie's prior inconsistent
statements from the first interview implicating Defendant in the events of the
evening. See Subsection B, supra. The jury'was also able to see and hear Pam as she
testified at trial, permitting them,,,, to ditvitly assess her credible;,
Defendant s final clain i„ of i„i [effective assistai ice i lecessarily fail s,
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rience,
.

.• .

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted Tunao/ffi 2011.

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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R I JLE 23.B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO
DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
(a) Grounds for motion.; time.. \. party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact,
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel... The motion shall, be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on. appeal, which,,, if'
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon, a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from.
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been, available to a. party.
(lb) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on
al that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The
- •*" shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the
. as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the
iii! ffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
cl j " i ri to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days afte: :i.;: motion is filed. The
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be
addressed by the trial court in the event remand, is granted, unless the
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be
filed within 10 days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a.) and. (b) of this rule
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such clainjL
to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to
complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of
remand, absent a finding by the trial court, of good, cause for a. delay of
reasonable length.
- If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record, on
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed, or
retained.
(d) Effect
nient and. the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or
upon the court's motion,
•(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon, remand, the trial, court, shall
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings
of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be
considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court determines that
the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be
conductedDigitized
without
a jury and as soon, as practicable after remand. The burden
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof
shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written
findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and
the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the
order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of
entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay
of reasonable length.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same
standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.]
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ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
t e n . VIA i ; \ n k / \ : 5
. (oiiow:: J .ij:initions appl\ ^nder this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct nj iX :vrM>n i •: is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant,. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement,
(c) Hearsay. '''Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declar ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.
._
•
(d) Statements 'which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied cha1 -*e
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or m :
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a pa~*v
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a repress .;
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested ~.n
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E)
a statement by a coconspirator of a party di iring the course and in further- ance of the conspiracy.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
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OCT 11 2010
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

"APPEALS

OCT 2 I

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER DENYING REMAND
Case No. 20091086-CA

v.
Samuel Marlin King,
Defendant and Appellant,

Before Judges Orme, Roth, and Christiansen.
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the .
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a) , (b) .
King asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to obtain an expert witness and failing to discover medical
records. Although the motion is properly supported with
affidavits and otherwise well-presented, overall King has failed
to establish the likelihood that any such oversight was
prejudicial. The additional proposed testimony and records are
cumulative impeachment evidence regarding the victim's general
credibility. Such additional evidence is not likely to have
resulted in a different outcome. The victim's testimony was
supported by other testimony, and it is the jury's province to
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determine credibility and the weight to give a witness's
testimony.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.
Dated this 2l

day of October, 2010.

FOR THE COURT:

Orme, Judge

20091086-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 21, 2010, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
LINDA M. JONES
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
RYAN D. TENNEY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854

•

Dated this October 21, 2010.

Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20091086
District Court No. 081907657
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M,

LINDA M. JONES (5497)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444
Attorneys for Defendant

^5!?CM3tlVtKflL
( J U L f 5 2010

APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
23B MOTION TO REMAND
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE
RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE
ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

SAMUEL MARLIN KING,
Appellate Case No. 20091086-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Appellant Samuel King is appealing from a judgment of conviction for aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (2008); and
aggravated assault, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(2008). R. 126-27. The judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. King maintains
his due process rights and his right to the effective assistance of counsel were violated
when trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the case before trial.
Pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. P., King respectfully requests that this Court
remand the case to the trial court for supplementation of the record on appeal with facts
supporting the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In connection with the request,

1
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King has attached the Affidavits of Glen R. Hanson, Ph.D., D.D.S. (Addendum B), and
Manny Garcia (Addendum C). In accordance with State v. Johnston, the affidavits contain specific, nonspeculative facts that are readily shown but not contained in the record
on appeal. 2000 UT App 290, f 10, 13 P.3d 175 (defendant must specify facts "that
might have helped his case"). The affidavits support that King's attorney was constitutionally deficient in his performance, and the deficient performance resulted in prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2008, the State filed an information against Jackie Juarez and King
for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. R. 1-1B. On October 6, 2009, the
trial court began a two-day trial in King's case. R. 96; 121. The State called five
witnesses to testify: Pamela Westphal, the complaining witness; Juarez, the co-defendant;
Detective Gordon, the lead detective; Detective Folau, the arresting officer; and Diana
Miller, a friend of Westphal. The State's witnesses presented the following evidence.
A. PAMELA WESTPHAL HAS SIGNIFICANT MENTAL HEALTH AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE ISSUES AFFECTING HER MENTAL CONDITION.
Pamela Westphal suffers from depression, methamphetamine-induced psychoses,
and post-traumatic-stress disorder. R. 152:5-6, 52, 55-56. She is on prescription drugs.
R. 152:6 (she has taken Zoloft for five years and she takes Trazadone); 152:53. She is a
drug addict. R. 152:53. She uses crack cocaine. R. 152:52-53. She is an alcoholic. R.
152:88; seealsoR.

151:199. She mixes drugs and alcohol. R. 152:53. Also, she

occasionally lives on the streets. R. 152:5.

2
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Westphal met King in the fall of 2007, R. 152:4, or in early 2008. R. 152:43. In
2008, they lived together on 500 East and 3300 South, and then moved to Center Street.
R. 152:6-7. Westphal borrowed money or sold drugs to pay half the rent on the first
apartment. R. 152:43-45. The Road Home paid rent on the second apartment. R. 152:45.
In late 2007 or early 2008 Westphal relied on her mental-illness diagnoses and
psychoses to apply for a large disability payment from the Social Security Department.
See R. 152:8, 54-55. In August or September 2008, she received a payment in the
amount of $26,000. R. 152:8, 47. Westphal and King used some of the money on crack
cocaine. R. 152:49. Also, with King's help, she opened an account and deposited some
of the funds. R. 152:49; see also UL at 11, 50 (stating King tried to convince her to put
money in his account). In addition, she gave $5,000 to King because he "kept harping"
on her, and she spent "another probably couple of thousand." R. 152:9, 62-63 (stating
she gave the money to him so he would get away from her). She gave money to strangers
and to people she knew. R. 152:10-11, 58, 60-61. She withdrew money "[q]uite a few"
times, and as much as $500 a day. R. 152:57-58. By the end of September 2008,
Westphal had spent or given away all her money. R. 152:108.
Within "[a] couple of weeks" or four or five days after Westphal received the
check from Social Security, she left King. R. 152:47, 74. She claimed she felt tlireatened
or intimidated by him. R. 152:11-12, 63, 74-75 (stating King "was getting worse" and
was pushing for more money). According to Westphal, King hit her, and he picked her up
by the throat and tried to strangle her. R. 152:12, 74-75.
3
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After she moved out, she was "homeless for a week or two." R. 152:13, 64. Or
she rented a suite in Midvale for three weeks. R. 152:42. But see R. 152:64 (she did not
rent housing but bought clothes). Also, she went to Pioneer Park and the shelter. R.
152:14. In early October 2008, Westphal moved into Diana Miller's home. R. 152:40,
41. But see R. 151:190-91 (it was early September). In addition, she found a new
boyfriend, Bruce, and they spent money on hotels, crack, food, clothing, and cabs. R.
152:77. Westphal did not track the amount of money she spent on crack or how much
she used. R. 152:59, 60. She withdrew as much money as she wanted each day and
spent it on whatever she wanted. R. 152:58.
On September 25, 2008, Westphal withdrew money from the bank and either gave
it away or spent it. R. 152:62. In addition, she went to Pioneer Park with Bruce. R.
152:14. She smoked crack cocaine and shared a pint of vodka with others. R. 152:14-15,
38, 77 (she drank four hours before "the incident"); see also R. 152:86 (she smoked crack
four to six hours earlier). After it became dark, people left the park and Westphal became
separated from Bruce. See R. 152:15.
According to Westphal, at some point, a black electrical cord was placed around
her throat. R. 152:15. It was not pulled tight, but placed perfectly. R. 152:16. Westphal
claimed that King told Juarez to put the cord around her throat, R. 152:16, 84; and King
and Juarez walked or dragged Westphal to a picnic table. R. 152:16, 84-85. The cord
was tight when it became caught between slates on the table. R. 152:17-18, 19-20.
Westphal claimed she was tied to the table and she thought she would break her neck. R.
4
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152:76. Also, she claimed that King told a woman named Alaska that Westphal had
disrespected him. R. 152:18, 22; see also 152:23 (claiming Juarez made the statement).
According to Westphal, Alaska tried to punch her. R. 152:19-20. In addition, King
threatened her with a knife, he said he would kill her, and he smacked her a couple of
times on the back of the head. R. 152:22-23, 81. While at the park, King and Juarez
drank vodka. 152:23

.•

After 20 or 30 minutes, King called for a cab. R. 152:21. When it arrived,
"[King] and [Juarez] told [Westphal] not to say a word" or King "would kill [her]" with
the knife. R. 152:23. Westphal made conflicting statements about the knife: she reported
that King held a knife to her side as they got into the cab, R. 152:71-72, 81; she reported
that King may have put the knife away when they got into the cab, R. 152:82; and she
claimed King did not have a knife at Pioneer Park. R. 152:124, 153-54.
The cab took them to King's apartment. When they arrived, King "kept telling
[her] off about [her] boyfriend, and how much [she] kept disrespecting him, how stupid
[she] was, and that he was going to kill [her]." R. 152:25. Westphal claimed that King hit
her on the back of the head, he threatened her, and he said he would take her to the bank
the next morning for her money. R. 152:25, 26-28, 34. Also, King and Juarez offered
Westphal something to eat and she refused. She was too upset because she was at the
apartment "against [her] will." R. 152:26, 85-86. King gave clippers to Westphal to
clean her fingernails. R. 152:86-87. And they all drank vodka. R. 152:29, 53, 72.
Westphal testified that at some point King handed a roll of duct tape to Juarez and
5
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told her to tape Westphal. R. 152:30-32, 67, 84. As Juarez taped her, Westphal did not
resist because she was scared and crying. R. 152:30. Juarez taped her wrists and ankles.
R. 152: 31-32. The tape was snug. R. 152:31. While Westphal was bound, King forced
her to drink vodka. R. 152:30, 32, 87-89. Also, Westphal claimed that King smacked her
on the back of the head. R. 152:82.
According to Westphal, King took a pocketknife and placed it on a hot plate or
burner to heat it. R. 152:32-33, 73. He threatened to cut out her tongue. R. 152:33. He
put the knife down when the smoke alarm went off, and they continued to drink. R.
152:33, 34, 73-74. Westphal stated she was in shock and fearing for her life. R. 152:3435 (she was at the apartment for three or four hours). King and Juarez fell asleep, R.
152:35; and Westphal began to fidget and wiggle and eventually she undid the tape. R.
152:35-36. She went to a Maverik store and called police. R. 152:36, 94-95. She may
have said to the clerk, "Here come some of the friends." "I will get shot." R. 152:95.
Detective Folau responded to Westphal's call and observed duct tape on her wrists
and ankles. R. 151:59; State's Ex. 1, 2, 15. She appeared to be scared and crying., R.
151:59. Westphal told Folau that Juarez bound her with tape, R. 151:79, and she directed
Folau to the apartment on Center Street. See R. 151:62. Westphal then went to the police
station for an interview. She spoke with Detective Gordon and remembered only bits and
pieces of the interview. R. 152:96. She asked Gordon to take the tape off "because
[Juarez's] fingerprints are on here, and I want her to pay." R. 152:152. Also, she told
Gordon that her ex-boyfriend, Joe, may have had something to do with this. R. 152:99.
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gordon described Westphal as emotional, "reversing] back," then talking again,
volatile, and shell shocked. R. 152:114. Westphal "would go off on things. She would
talk about Joe, about how maybe he was involved." R. 152:151. And Gordon "would
just direct her back to the actual point that we were talking about." R. 152:151. Gordon
thought Westphal had "some mental health issues, but not enough to not track what
[Gordon] was saying to her, so clearly she has some problems, but she was capable of
talking to [Gordon] and answering the questions appropriately." R. 152:122.
During the interview with Gordon, Westphal stated, "I just want people to .. . just
to quit tryin to kill me." Addendum C, Ex. 1 at 25. Also she claimed that Joe
"supposedly has a big hit for my head . . . obviously for tomorrow night," and "the price
has d~, tripled on my head." IcL, at 45, 47. She stated people at the police station "don't
like me either." IcL at 36. And she claimed that after a car incident in West Jordan "last
week," Joe called the shelter "and said if I went and testified I'm definitely dead. So I
didn't go." Id^ at 51.
Westphal stated she would "end up in the nut house," and that she had not been
okay "for a long time." IdL at 30. She told Gordon she has "PTSD" and "problems with
[her] family in jail. A lot of problems." IcL at 38. She said, "I've been pullin' my hair
out for a while, that's why my hair back here has [a] bald spot and stuff." Id, at 43. She
said, "I think I had enough of the drugs and alcohol," and "sometimes it doesn't stop
when I . .. even [when] I quit." Id. at 49.
Gordon testified that two weeks after the first interview, Westphal showed up at
7
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the police department and told Gordon she was "scared to death" that Juarez and King
were going to get out of jail and kill her. R. 152:123. Also, she told Gordon that King
did not hold a knife to her side when they got into the cab. R. 152:124.
After the purported incident here, Westphal went to a detox unit, and she stopped
using drugs for "a whole four months." R. 152:56-57. She acknowledged at trial that she
now uses drugs when she slips, R. 152:56, and she had used crack cocaine within the past
month or two before trial. R. 152:57, 107.
B. JACKIE JUAREZ MAINTAINED THAT KING DID NOT ASSAULT OR
KIDNAP WESTPHAL: RATHER JUAREZ PUT TAPE ON WESTPHAL9S
WRISTS AND ANKLES AND SHE ACTED ALONE.
The State called Jackie Juarez to testify. She was with King at Pioneer Park on
September 25, 2008. R. 151:93, 127. She saw Westphal. R. 151:94. Juarez and
Westphal used drugs; King did not. R. 151:93, 128. Juarez testified that "everybody was
drinking" Montego Bay Rum. R. 151:93, 96, 127; see also R. 151:96 (King "drank a
little and stopped a little").
According to Juarez, on September 25, Westphal told people that her mother had
died. R. 151:100. Shortly after she made that statement, Westphal's mother called King
on the phone. R. 151:100. King handed the phone to Westphal and she spoke to her
mother. R. 151:169. Also, Juarez had an electrical cord that belonged to Westphal. R.
151:97, 101, 135. She went up to Westphal and said, "Parn, I've had this cord forever,"
and she draped or dangled the cord around Westphal's neck to return it to her. R. 151:98.
After dark, Juarez, King, and Alaska went to a picnic table and Westphal joined
8
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them. R. 151:103-04. Juarez claimed King was hurt over his relationship with Westphal.
R. 151:105, 178-79. Also, Alaska tried to hit Westphal, but Juarez shielded her. R.
151:107-08.
Juarez became concerned that Westphal had no place to sleep. R. 151:108-09,
134. She invited Westphal to go with them to King's apartment. R. 151:109. Westphal
expressed that she was scared because King was mad at her, and King expressed that he
did not want Westphal at the apartment. R. 151:109-10, 133,177-78. He said Westphal
could get her clothes. R. 151:173; see also R. 151:134. But he did not want her to stay.
R. 151:133. Juarez assured Westphal that nothing would happen to her. R. 151:109. She
said, "Let's go over to the house and get something to eat. We can talk. Everything's
goingtobe all right." R. 151:110, 141, 177.
According to Juarez, King called a cab, and when they arrived at the apartment,
Juarez began to fix dinner. R. 151:110-11, 144; see also R. 151:149 (it was about 9:30).
King went to his room in the back. R. 151:111. When he returned, he gave a knife to
Westphal to clean her fingernails. R. 151:111-12, 144, 166. Juarez described Westphal
as a mess, filthy, dirty and nasty. R. 151:145. King tried to get Westphal to eat, and they
all drank vodka. R. 151:96, 112; see also R. 151:147-48 (she ate a little meal and they
started to drink again). Also, King gave clean clothes to Westphal. R. 151:134.
Westphal sat at the table at the apartment and talked. R. 151:113. King and
Westphal argued and debated, but King "didn't threaten her." R. 151:115-16. King
made a motion with a cigarette but did not burn or touch Westphal. R. 151:117; see also
9
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R. 151:116 (Westphal was not bruised or touched that evening); 151:161 (King did not
try to strike Westphal earlier at the park).
As they continued to drink, King said Westphal could not sleep in the bedroom
withhim. R. 151:113-14. She could use a sleeping bag on the floor. R. 151:114. Juarez
planned to sleep on a futon in the living room. R. 151:114,150.
According to Juarez, if Westphal drinks or uses drugs, her personality changes;
she is different, "her mind [is]n't there," she makes no sense and says "crazy stuff." R.
151:102, 128, 130, 159-60. That night, Westphal began to get on Juarez's nerves. R.
151:148. "She just wouldn't shut up." R. 151:148,156. Juarez did not remember taping
Westphal, but testified that she must have. R. 151:119. She maintained that King was
notinvolved. R. 151:121. Juarez had the tape for moving boxes. R. 151:115, 152. She
and Westphal were "messing around," so she must have taped Westphal. R. 151:153.
King was not in the room; he was in the back bedroom. R. 151:119,121 ("I was the only
one in the room. He didn't tape her up"); 151:154, 164, 166. Juarez taped Westphal's
mouth, and she thought she taped Westphal's hands and feet. R. .151:154-55. Juarez
acknowledged she may have said she would take Westphal to the bank in the morning.
R. 151:121-22, 156.
Juarez then passed out or fell asleep. R. 151:156. She was awakened by an
officer shining a light in her face. R. 151:157. She may have said "Come in," but she did
not remember. IcL Juarez was arrested for robbery and kidnapping, R. 151:70, and
interviewed twice by Detective Gordon. Juarez denied making statements implicating
10
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King. R. 151:118, 122-23, 178-79. She maintained she was responsible for events that
night, and King was not involved. R. 151:185-86. Juarez entered a plea on a
misdemeanor count. See R. 151:90; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-5-102 (2008). And
the State dismissed the original charges against her. R. 151:89.
C. GORDON USED TACTICS TO MANIPULATE JUAREZ'S STATEMENTS.
Gordon acknowledged interviewing Juarez twice. The first interview was
recorded. R. 152:148, 126. According to Gordon, Juarez said the following: she knew
about Westphal's money, R. 152:127; King wanted Westphal to get clothes from the
apartment, R. 152:127; Westphal did not want to go to the apartment, but Juarez assured
"her that everything would be okay," R. 152:128; King and Alaska tried to hit Westphal
at the park, but Juarez blocked them, R. 152:128; King said things at the apartment to
scare Westphal, see R. 152:129; and Juarez refused to say who placed tape on Westphal's
wrists and ankles. R. 152:129-30, 137. Overall, Juarez did not deny involvement and her
admissions backed up parts of Westphal's story. R. 152:149.
During the second interview, Gordon acknowledged using trickery and deception.
She testified that officers are allowed to "use any tactic we want." R. 152:150; 152:133.
She "bluffed [Juarez] quite a bit" to see if Juarez would change her story. R. 152:132. "I
mean as long as we're not assaulting them or berating them or, you know, beating them
down, or you know, touching them or any of those sorts of things, we can run any gambit
of things [. W]e can say[,] 'You're going to get a deal out of this,' which may or may not
be true in some cases. We can tell them that the other person has rolled on them. We can
11
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tell them any number of things. You know, in my current job[,] I do special victims,
which are mostly like rape or child molestation type cases, and you'll even get there and
start telling [them] that [we] understand their perverse ways so that they'll talk to [us]."
R. 152:132-33. The second interview took place at the jail. R. 152:132. Relevant parts
of the interview were not recorded. R. 152:156.
Gordon told Juarez that technicians found King's prints on the duct tape, R. 152:
136; and that King was blaming her for kidnapping and assaulting Westphal. R. 152:133,
149. Gordon was not authorized to negotiate with Juarez; nevertheless, she represented
that prosecutors would give Juarez a deal. R. 152:133-34. According to Gordon, her
tactics worked: "in this particular case," Juarez "gave me a little bit more information
than she gave me the first time, and reiterated some of the same things she had already
told me." R. 152:150. Gordon maintained that Juarez implicated King, and the two of
them were in on it together, R. 152:155-56; Juarez claimed King wanted money, R.
152:134; Juarez claimed King was "enraged at [Westphal]," because she was having sex
with somebody else, R. 152:135; Juarez claimed King was mad at Westphal and wanted
to hurt her for giving money away to people at the park, R. 152:136; Juarez stated if she
had not been there, King would have killed Westphal, R. 152:135; and Juarez expressed
concern that technicians may find her fingerprints on the duct tape. R. 152:137.
The State's final witness, Diana Miller, was not at the park or the apartment on
September 25 or 26, 2008; she testified that Westphal now lives with her. R. 151:191.
At the end of the case, the jury found King guilty as charged. R. 152:190-91.
12
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ARGUMENT
DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
WITH EVIDENCE.
King's attorney failed to investigate issues relating to Westphal5s mental
condition. The failure to investigate qualified as ineffective assistance of counsel since
an investigation would support that Westphal's history of mental illness and drug abuse
influenced her ability to accurately perceive, recall, and recount events. A person with
the mental health and substance abuse issues described by Westphal would have impaired
cognitive processes. Indeed, an investigation would have been relevant to King's case
where the State relied on Westphal's perceptions to prosecute King. In addition, King
was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel and the lack of a proper
investigation.
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE ISSUES
RELEVANT TO THE DEFENDANT'S CASE.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a criminal
defendant with the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the criminal
prosecution. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). A defendant
raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) his attorney's
performance fell "'below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and (2) "'but for"5
the deficient performance, "'there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.'" State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 68, 152 P.3d 321 (citation
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omitted); see also State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 38, 163 P.3d 695 (in proving
ineffective assistance, "'[DJefendant must overcome the strong presumption that his trial
counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the court that there was no
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions'") (citation omitted).
In addition, "'[t]he Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate,
because reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional decisions[,] and
informed legal choices can be made only after investigation of options.'" State v.
Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah Ct App. 1989) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at
680); see also State v. Huzzins, 920 P.2d 1195,1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ('"counsel has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). An
adequate investigation "sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how to
build the best defense." Hales, 2007 UT 14, % 69.
On the other hand, "'a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical
decision.'" State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Templin,
805 P.2d 182,188 (Utah 1990)).
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including
the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance cannot
fall within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." This is because
a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is only
after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable
decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons.
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (footnote omitted); id at 188 n. 25 ("Several courts have held
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that criminal defendants have been denied the right to assistance of counsel in situations
where counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of obtaining
prospective defense witnesses"); see also State v. Walker, 2010 UT App 157, f 15, 658
Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (lack of investigation renders counsel's assistance ineffective).
Moreover, the duty to investigate includes the duty to assess whether counsel
should call an expert to assist or to testify at trial. In State v. Hales, the State charged the
defendant with the murder of a child, who sustained brain injuries when he was five
months old. 2007 UT 14, f 1. The State relied on an expert's interpretation of CT scans
to implicate the defendant in the child's death. IcL atffi[72-74. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he appealed. LL atfflf1-2. He claimed his trial attorneys were ineffective
for failing to obtain an expert to interpret the CT scans for the defense. IcL at % 67. The
Utah Supreme Court agreed. It ruled the interpretation of CT scans "was critical to the
State's case against Hales." IcL at f 69. Also, the trial attorneys were on notice at the
time of the preliminary hearing that the CT scans were pivotal. IcL at f<f 74-78. The "centrality" of this evidence made it necessary for the defense to obtain an expert. IcL at f 80.
Moreover, the court ruled that the trial attorneys' decision not to use an expert was
tactical but unreasonable. IcL atffl[73,79-80. And the unreasonable decision prejudiced
the defendant since an expert would have provided a "competing interpretation" for the
CT scans that likely would "cast doubt" on the State's theory that the defendant caused
the child's death. Id at ^ 91; see also McHenrv v. State, 177 P.3d 981, 985-86 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2008) (where there is no physical evidence and the case turns on the credibility of
15
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the prosecution's witness, defense counsel's failure to investigate is ineffective); Barkell
v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 699 (10th Cir. 2006) (trial counsel's failure to retain an expert to
assist with the cross-examination of witnesses may result in constitutional
ineffectiveness). Where the pivotal facts at issue involved a medical explanation, it was
necessary to obtain an expert for the defense. See Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 80.
(1) King's Attorney Failed to Investigate.
(a) Pretrial Information Raised Questions About WestphaVs Mental Condition.
In this case, the State charged King and Juarez with aggravated assault and
aggravated kidnapping. R. 1-1B. The State relied primarily on Westphal's perceptions
of events for its prosecution, see R. 1A, where Westphal claimed that King and Juairez
took her against her will to an apartment near the capitol, bound her with tape, and
assaulted her. See, e.g.. Addendum C, Ex, 1 (interview with Westphal). Westphal
specifically implicated King in the crimes by claiming he directed Juarez to place a cord
around her throat as the initial aggressive act at Pioneer Park, R. 152:16; he provoked a
woman named Alaska to assault her at the park, R. 152:18; he hit her, threatened her with
a knife, and threatened her life, R. 152:22, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33; he directed her to get into a
cab at knife point, R. 152:71, 72, 81; but see R. 152:82 (lines 24-25), 124 (lines 7-9), 153
(lines 21-25); he threatened to take her to the bank in the morning to withdraw money
from her account, R. 152:28-29, 34; he directed Juarez to put tape on Westphal's wrists
and ankles at the apartment, R. 152:30-32; and he forced alcohol down Westphal's throat.
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Id. Notably, the State did not present physical evidence implicating King in crime.
In addition, in connection with making criminal allegations, Westphal exhibited
impaired mental and emotional processes. For example, when she reported events to
Detective Gordon, she claimed that a person named Joe Hernandez wanted to kill her.
See Addendum C, Ex. 1 at 45-47. She expressed that other people were after her to kill
her or do her harm, idL, at 25; and she made references to her mental illnesses and drug
use. See UL at 30, 38, 49. Moreover, prior to trial, King's attorney was on notice that
Westphal had been diagnosed with various mental illnesses and methamphetamineinduced psychoses, Addendum C, f 2; she relied on her mental illness diagnoses and
psychoses to apply for a lump sum payment from Social Security in late 2007 or early
2008, ici at ^f 4; she used methamphetamine for years before her diagnoses, and she
received the psychoses diagnosis from a therapist at Valley Mental Health: Safe Haven,
see id_ at f 2 (she used meth for several years); see also R. 152:52 (she used meth heavily
for two years); she used and abused other drugs, see_ Addendum C, ^ftf 2, 5, 6; she
received substance abuse treatment from Store Front, id_ at ^[ 2, 4; and she had been
charged with several offenses, some of them relating to substance abuse. IcL at f 8. Also,
counsel learned that Westphal received a large payment from Social Security in August

1

The investigating officers made no attempt to locate or collect the cord that Juarez
draped around Westphal's neck at Pioneer Park. R. 152:142-43. In addition, Westphal
could not confirm that King used a knife presented at trial. See, e.g., R. 152:66 (saying "I
don't know"). Officers did not recover usable fingerprints in the case. R. 152:121. And
Westphal had no bruises or marks on her as a result of the alleged events. See Addendum
C,Ex. 1 at 43-44.
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or September 2008; she spent a significant, but unknown, amount of money on crack
cocaine; and she used crack cocaine on September 25, 2008. Id^ at ^ 5-6.
(b) The Research Supports that a Person with WestphaVs History Likely Has
Significantly Impaired Cognitive Processes.
Although counsel was aware of the facts surrounding Westphal's mental
condition, see, e.g., R. 151:50, 55, he failed to properly investigate the facts for King's
defense. See_ Addendum C, \ 10. Indeed, an investigation would support that a person
with Westphal's history of mental illnesses and drug abuse likely had impaired cognitive
processes and perceptions. According to the research, methamphetamine or cocaine
abuse has long-lasting and sometimes permanent effects on the brain, altering a person's
perception of, ability to recall, and ability to recount events. Addendum B, ^j 6. Even
short term use of methamphetamine or cocaine can have dramatic effects, including
hallucinations, hyperthermia, paranoia, amnesia, anxiety, confusion, unconsciousness,
and in some cases, death. Id.
In addition, nationally recognized medical organizations qualify drug abuse or
addiction as a mental illness or a mental disorder. IcL at ^J 7. Drug addiction is a complex
brain disease that changes the brain structure in ways seen with other mental disorders,
including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. Failure to properly and aggressively
treat an addiction will jeopardize a person's chance of recovery. IcL
Moreover, use of methamphetamine literally damages the nerve endings of the
human brain cells, resulting in cognitive impairments. IcLdX*{ 8(a). Studies have
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revealed that methamphetamme users experience severe structural and functional changes
in areas of the brain associated with emotion, memory, and decision making, which
account for a break down in emotional and cognitive responses and functioning. LL at ^
8(f). When used regularly and in high doses, even over a short period of time,
methamphetamme causes long-lasting damage to the central nervous system. Id. at f
8(b). Long-term effects include inability to properly assess circumstances, anxiety,
confusion, insomnia, mood disturbances, paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations,
and delusions. IcL Some of the effects of methamphetamme abuse are in part reversible
and recoverable after two years. Other effects have not shown recovery even after two
years, indicating long-lasting or irreversible damage. Id. at <[ 8(f).
An investigation would support that persistent and long-term use of methamphetamme results in a medical diagnosis for methamphetamine-induced psychoses. Id. at ^
8(c). An individual with a psychoses diagnosis can experience significant impairment of
cognitive processes - for months or even years - after discontinuing use of methamphetamme. IcL Stress can trigger a spontaneous recurrence of a methamphetamine-induced
psychosis in individuals diagnosed as psychotic. IdL at f 8(d). Also, crack cocaine may
trigger and exacerbate the psychosis effect in a person susceptible to methamphetamineinduced psychoses; and the effects can last for weeks or longer. Id. at^f 8(e).
Likewise, cocaine used in large amounts or over a significant period of time
causes a more intense high, restlessness, irritability, anxiousness, vertigo, and paranoia.
Id. atfflf6, 9(d). Cocaine abusers experience severe medical complications associated
19
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with the drug use, including disturbances in heart rhythm, heart attacks, strokes, seizures,
headaches, abdominal pain, and nausea. IcL at \ 9(d). Repeated cocaine use causes
sensitivity to the anxiety-producing effects of the drug, meaning increased irritability,
restlessness, paranoia, and at times, a loss of touch with reality. IcL at ^ 9(e). Also,
chronic users experience a loss of appetite, weight loss, and malnourishment. M.
Given Westphal's history and the pivotal importance of her perceptions to the
prosecution, the above information would have been relevant to King's defense. See, e.g..
State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) ("perhaps the more important factors
affecting the accuracy" of a person's ability to perceive events are those factors
originating within the person, including drug or alcohol use); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d
785, 788 (Utah 1984) (evidence of drug use is admissible "if it shows that it impaired the
witness's perception of the events to which he testified"); State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d
929, 930 (Utah 1979) ("It is quite universally accepted" that use of narcotics in some
circumstances may bear "upon the credibility of the witness"). As part of the defense,
King's attorney should have investigated how mental illnesses and drug abuse - as
described by Westphal - likely would have impaired a person's cognitive processes,
functions, and perceptions.
Yet the record is silent on the issues. See Record. Instead, the prosecution and the
defense both elicited testimony from Westphal concerning her mental illnesses and drug
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use. While that testimony was pertinent, it failed to shed light on the relevant science.
Moreover, defense counsel's cross-examination on the issues allowed Westphal to
deny the effects of her mental illnesses {see R. 152:52, 54, 57), thereby conveying
incorrect information to the jury. See Addendum B, ^ 15, 17; see also id. at f 6
(Westphal likely was "unaware of her own compromised processes"); see also State v.
Clopten. 2009 UT 84,ffl[16, 21, 223 P.3d 1103 (cross-examination has its own
shortcomings, particularly since witnesses may not be aware of their own limitations).
Since counsel failed to investigate, his assistance was constitutionally defective.
See, e.g.. State v. Ott 2010 UT 1, \ 38, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (trial counsel's omissions
are not excusable if there is no conceivable beneficial value to the defendant); Hales,
2007 UT f 4, f 80 (since the medical evidence was central to the case, it was necessary
for defense counsel to investigate and to retain an expert); State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, \
32, 135 P.3d 864 (trial counsel may not be excused for his failure to pursue a course of
action in the case, even if the course is an open question in the jurisdiction); Gordon, 913
2

Westphal acknowledged mental illness diagnoses and a diagnosis for psychoses. See R.
152:5, 6. She used methamphetamine for years and received her psychoses diagnosis
while being treated at Safe Haven. R. 152:52, 54-56. She described herself as a drug
addict and alcoholic. R. 152:53, 56-57, 88. She used prescription drugs for years, and
she used drugs and alcohol together. R. 152:6, 53. Westphal spent an unspecified
amount of money on an unknown quantity of crack cocaine for a time before September
25, 2008. R. 152:49, 52, 58-60, 77, 108. She withdrew money from the bank on
September 25, and spent it or gave it away. R. 152:62. She smoked crack cocaine and
shared vodka with others on September 25. R. 152:14-15, 38, 77. By the end of
September, Westphal had spent all her money. R. 152:108. She had not received effective or successful treatment for her abuse and mental illnesses: she stopped using drugs at
one point for four months, and currently uses if she slips up. R. 152:56-57. Westphal
smoked crack cocaine as recently as a month or two before trial. R. 152:57, 107.
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P.2d at 356 ("ca decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision'")
(citation omitted); Crestani, 111 P.2d at 1090 (counsel is able to make informed choices
about a defense only after proper investigation); State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, \ 10,
223 P.3d 1137 (counsel was ineffective when he failed to highlight inconsistencies).
(2) Proper Investigation Would Support Use of an Expert Witness.
If defense counsel had properly investigated the circumstances and the law in this
case, he would have been able to make reasonable decisions about presenting King's
defense to the jury. See. Crestani, 111 P.2d at 1090 (counsel can make informed choices
only after engaging in a reasonable investigation). For example, Utah law supports the
use of an expert to assist in presenting a defense.
Specifically, Rule 702 governs expert evidence. The Utah Supreme Court enacted
the current rule in 2007. It states the following:
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis
for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods
underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii)
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the
facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the
case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.
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Utah R.Evid. 702 (2010).
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that expert evidence is admissible if it
meets the following conditions: first, the expert must base his opinion "on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." Eskelson v. Davis Hospital and Medical
Center, 2010 UT 15, f 8, 651 Utah Adv. Rep. 33. Second, the expert must support his
testimony with sufficient facts and he must reliably apply his experience to the facts of
the case. IcL. atfflf16-19 (the expert relied on the deposition of a witness to formulate an
opinion; and based on the deposition, the expert could opine that a child suffered a
perforated eardrum while in the defendant's care). And third, the expert's testimony
must assist the jury. M at If 20 (evidence that "is cumulative or more prejudicial than
probative" is not admissible).
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated that Rule 702 allows an
expert to testify in the form of a lecture or a dissertation on a technical or specialized
issue in the case. In State v. Clopten, the court addressed use of expert evidence to
educate the jury on factors contributing to inaccurate eyewitness identification. The court
quoted from the advisory committee note for Rule 702 as follows: " c It might be important
in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without
attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case.'" 2009 UT 84, \ 36
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note (2007)). Also, the court stated,
Typically, an expert is called by a criminal defendant to explain how certain
factors relevant to the identification in question could have produced a mistake.
The expert may or may not be familiar with the facts of the case prior to the
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testimony, and in any case will not offer an opinion on whether the specific
eyewitness identification is accurate or not. Instead, the relevant research is
discussed in more general terms, thus allowing the jury to apply the information to
whatever degree it sees fit.
1<L_ at \ 19. The court ruled that an expert's dissertation on eyewitness identification is
beneficial to a case for two reasons. First, a dissertation educates the jury on factors
influencing an eyewitness's perceptions; and second, it quantifies known information,
i.e., how a lapse in time affects an eyewitness's memory. Id^ at ^f 20. In addition, an
expert is allowed to "'give a dissertation or exposition' of factors" for a case u[a]s long as
the expert does not attempt to tell the jury that a specific eyewitness identification either
is or is not accurate." IcL at \ 36 (internal citation omitted); see also State v. Worthen*
2009 UT 79, f 31, 222 P.3d 1144 ("a defendant may present evidence that casts doubt on
the State's ability to prove all the elements of the crime").
According to the court, "[w]hen expert testimony is used correctly, the end result
is a jury that is better able to reach a just decision." Clop ten, 2009 UT 84, \ 20. The
court considered expert evidence to be particularly helpful in cases of eyewitness
identification because juries typically are unaware of deficiencies in human perceptions
and memory, and juries tend to give great weight to the testimony of an eyewitness. See
UL_ at <[| 15. In that regard, the court ruled "that the testimony of a qualified expert
regarding factors that have been shown to contribute to inaccurate eyewitness
identifications should be admitted whenever it meets the requirements of rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence." IL at \ 30; see also Long, 721 P.2d at 488 ("perhaps the more
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important factors affecting the accuracy o f a person's perceptions "are those factors
originating within the observer" including such factors as "drug or alcohol use").
Utah law also supports the admissibility of expert evidence to assist the jury in
assessing whether a witness has the mental capacity to accurately perceive events and to
recount them truthfully. In State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642, the complaining
witness, Carleen, claimed the defendant sexually molested her. See id^ at ff 5-6. Under
an earlier version of Rule 702, the State called Dr. Hawks, a psychologist, to testify
whether Carleen could have been coached to make the claims. IcL at \ 6. Carleen had
Down's Syndrome and was unable to read or write. She was 34 years old and had the
cognitive abilities of a three and a half year old. Id^ at *| 2. Dr. Hawks had specialized
training and knowledge. IcL at ^f 18. He evaluated Carleen and relied on her statements
and history. Se£ id^ atffl[6, 11, 16, 18. He testified "it was 'probably not likely'" that
Carleen had the mental capacity or the sophistication to be coached in her allegations. Id.
at T| 13; see also id. at Tfl[ 6, 11.
The defendant objected to the opinion evidence, and the Utah Supreme Court
upheld it: it stated that Dr. Hawks "did not offer a direct opinion of Carleen's truthfulness
about the alleged sexual abuse." IcL at ^ 13. He offered an opinion about Carleen's
general cognitive abilities and whether she was capable of fabricating a story. Id.
Consequently, the evidence was proper under the rale. M at ^f 14 (the rules of evidence
do "not prohibit an expert such as Dr. Hawks from giving testimony from which a jury
could infer the veracity of the witness"); State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1993) ("a
25
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psychologist, a psychiatrist, or a similar expert" may give an opinion of a diagnostic or
evaluative nature "based on statements made during an interview if the opinion cdoes not
cross the line from being a statement of the basis of an expert opinion . . . to being a
comment on the truthfulness on a particular occasion"5) (citation omitted).
The above principles apply in this case. An expert was available to consult and
assist with King's defense. See infra, Arg. A.(2)(a). Yet King's attorney failed to consult
with a professional or engage in an investigation of the issues. See^ infra, Arg. A.(2)(b).
(a) A Qualified Expert Would Have Consulted with King's Attorney During
Trial, and Testified that WestphaVs Mental Health History and Drug Use Likely
Compromised Her Ability to Accurately Perceive and Interpret Events, Thereby
Impacting on Her Credibility as a Witness.
As set forth above, Westphal was the State's key witness at trial: the State relied
on her perceptions to prosecute King. Also, both parties made reference to her mental
health and drug abuse history in pretrial proceedings and at trial. See_ supra, Arg.
A.(l)(a); supra footnote 2, herein; see also R. 151:50, 55 (opening statements). While
that evidence was relevant to King's defense, it was not enough. Information as to how
Westphal's mental condition influenced her perceptions would have assisted the jury.
See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89 ("perhaps the more important factors affecting the accuracy
o f a person's perceptions are those factors originating within the person, including "drug
or alcohol use"); Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930 (a person's use of narcotics may bear on his
credibility as a witness).
To that end, the supplemental facts here support that Dr. Glen Hanson is a pro-
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fessor of pharmacology and toxicology at the University of Utah College of Pharmacy.
Addendum B. He holds a D.D.S. from the University of California, Los Angeles; and a
Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of Utah. Addendum B, ^f 1. He has held
numerous positions and received honors for his research on mental illness and drug abuse
issues, and their effects on the central nervous system. See_ id^ at ^j 2-4, 7, and Exhibit 1,
attached thereto. He has made hundreds of presentations in his professional and expert
capacity; he has testified before Congress and the Utah Legislature and as an expert for
the prosecution and the defense in several trials. Also, he has co-authored and edited
more than 200 articles and has served on the editorial board of major pharmacology and
neuroscience journals. Addendum B, f12-3, 5.
Dr. Hanson conducts research at the University of Utah to elucidate the bases for
neurological and psychiatric disorders, and the causes and consequences of drug abuse
and addiction. IcL at f 4. His area of expertise focuses on the neurochemical effects of
psychostimulants; he has worked extensively with drug users. IcL Dr. Hanson has
researched, tested, evaluated, and documented dramatic changes that occur in the brain
after abuse with such stimulants as the amphetamines and cocaine. IcL The research has
been confirmed, replicated, and validated many times over the years, and is approved and
accepted as reliable by scientists and professionals. IcL at \ 4. Indeed, the state and
federal governments identify methamphetamine and cocaine use as dangerous and toxic.
See Genetic Science Learning Center, Drugs of Abuse, http ://learn. genetics .Utah, edu/
content/addiction/drugs/abuse.html; U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., http://www.justice.
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gov/dea/concem/meth.html. Dr. Hanson is qualified to consult and to testify as an expert
with respect to the mental and emotional conditions and impairments of a person with
mental health diagnoses and a history of drug use and abuse. See Addendum B, Ex. 1.
He bases his opinions on reliable scientific and specialized knowledge.
If Dr. Hanson had been consulted in King's case, he would have been available to
assist counsel in preparation for trial and to inform the jury about mental health
diagnoses, drug use and abuse, and brain disorders and impairments. See Addendum B;
see also Utah R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note ("[i]t might be important in some cases
for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles"); Clopten, 2009 UT 84,
ffi[ 15, 19-20 (juries are unaware of deficiencies in human perception; and the rules
support expert evidence on factors contributing to eyewitness inaccuracies); Adams, 2000
UT 42, Tf 13 (an expert can offer an opinion about cognitive abilities and whether a
person is capable of fabricating a story); Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 68 (an expert may give an
opinion of an evaluative nature "based on statements made during an interview if the
opinion 'does not cross the line from being a statement of the basis of an expert opinion .
. . to being a comment on the truthfulness on a particular occasion'") (citation omitted);
State v. Clovten, 2008 UT App 205, If 34, 186 P.3d 1004 (Thome, J., concurring) (a live
witness should be allowed to "address the particular circumstances" of a case). He would
have been available to review Westphal's interview and to observe her at trial to reliably
apply his experiences and knowledge to this case. See, e.g., Addendum B,ffi[10, 19.
Specifically, Dr. Hanson would have been able to advise counsel and to testify at
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trial that a person with a history of mental illnesses and drug abuse - as described by
Westphal - likely would have impaired emotional and cognitive functioning, processes,
and responses. Addendum B, f 11. Individually and in combination, the mental illnesses
and drug use may contribute to inaccurate perceptions, an inability to process events and
circumstances, a distorted or exaggerated sense of reality, disorientation, paranoia,
irritability, sensitivity to sound and touch, confusion, hallucinations, hyperthermia,
amnesia, anxiety, and/or brain damage. M For a person with Westphal5s mental
illnesses and history, benign events and even friendly gestures may be misinterpreted as
against her will or aggressive; also, an unkind look or harmless gesture may be perceived
as threatening, aggressive, or a conspiracy to commit crime or do harm. IdL at ^f 12.
Dr. Hanson would have been able to illustrate how someone with Westphal5s
history and condition may misperceive facts: a benign cord draped around the neck may
be interpreted as a threat to kidnap; a harmless remark from a person who was once
friendly may be perceived as a threat against her life or intimidating; a persistent or
repeated suggestion or even a friendly invitation may be construed as an act against her
will; an innocent act may be linked to perceptions of hostility; and one person's conduct
may qualify as a conspiracy involving others - even when the others are not actually
present or involved. Addendum B, f 13.
Moreover, as an expert, Dr. Hanson would have been available to provide accurate
information, where Westphal conveyed incorrect facts to the jury about drug use and
mental illness. For example, she claimed that a methamphetamine-induced psychosis is
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not persistent. Setz R. 152:52. Dr. Hanson would have been able to clarify that
Westphal's denials about the effects of her mental illness are typical of a person with a
psychosis. Addendum B, ^ 15. Research shows that the effects of methamphetamine on
the central nervous system and its functions can be long term and perhaps permanent. Id^
Since Westphal admittedly used illegal drugs after her psychosis diagnosis, see R.
152:56-57, 107, her drug use would likely cause a psychosis to flair with long-lasting
effects. Addendum B,fflf8(e), 15. In that regard, Dr. Hanson's information about mental
illness and drug use would dispute Westphal's claims in ways that undermined her
credibility: where she continued to use drugs (see supra, footnote 2), her cognitive
processes likely would continue to be influenced by psychoses. Addendum B, ^ 8(e),
15; also compare R. 152:57, 86 (Westphal claimed that on September 25, she was no
longer high from the crack cocaine she had used earlier, but was sober); and Addendum
B, ^| 17 (Westphal's statement could be partially trae: while the short-term euphoria likely
had worn off after she ingested crack on September 25, it is likely that a person with
Westphal's mental illnesses and drug history would continue to experience impaired
cognitive functioning and responses long after use of the drug).
Unless a drug user - like Westphal - were to receive aggressive intervention and
consistent dependable treatment for the abuse and mental illnesses, her ability to perceive
events and to react normally likely would be compromised for a long period of time.
Addendum B, ^ 16. Also, she may be unaware of her own compromised processes. LL
In this case, an expert was available to advise defense counsel on the issues and to testify
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at trial to assist the jury in assessing the issues. An expert was available to provide
insight into Westphal's conditions, and to discuss how mental illness and drug use may
influence and impair a person's perceptions. In addition, an expert was available to point
out to the jury that some of Westphal's claims about her mental illnesses and drug abuse
were incorrect, raising substantial doubts about her credibility.
(b) Since King's Attorney Failed to Consult with an Expert, His Assistance Was
Constitutionally Deficient
Under the circumstances of this case, an attorney providing reasonable
professional assistance would have presented the evidence relevant to King's defense.
Since the issues concerning Westphal's mental illnesses and drug use were central to the
case and scientific in nature, it would have been evident to a reasonable attorney that the
defense should consult with an expert on mental health and drug abuse issues. See Utah
R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note ("It might be important in some cases for an expert to
educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply these
principles to the specific facts of the case"); Adams, 2000 UT 42, *[fl[ 13-14 (an expert's
testimony going to a witness's mental capacity is admissible); Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 68. A
qualified expert was available to consult with counsel in this case and to assist the jury
with information based on reliable scientific knowledge. See Addendum B.
King was at a distinct disadvantage since his attorney devised no plan for presenting
admissible evidence concerning the effects of mental illness and drug abuse on a person's
ability to accurately perceive, recall, and recount events.
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Since King's attorney failed to engage in an adequate investigation of the facts, he
was "'not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice'" about King's defense. See
Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^ 83 ("the defense could not reasonably have made [a] decision
[about the expert evidence] without first conducting a full investigation of the merits of
the case"). King's attorney provided constitutionally deficient assistance.
B. UTAH LAW ALLOWS DISCOVERY OF MENTAL HEALTH
DOCUMENTS.
King's trial attorney failed to obtain mental health records relevant to King's
defense. See State v. Worthed 2008 UT App 23, ^ 31, 177 P.3d 664 (records are discoverable for in camera review), affd, 2009 UT 79, 222 P.3d 1144. Westphal's mental
health documents should have been discovered as part of the pretrial investigation.
(1) A Witness *s Mental Health Documents Are Discoverable If the Defendant Has
Shown that the Witness's Mental or Emotional Condition Is Relevant to His
Defense, and the Documents Contain Exculpatory Evidence.
Although Utah law protects information contained in mental health files from
discovery, the protection is "not absolute." State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, \ 29, 982 P.2d
79; Utah R. Evid. 506(d). Documents are discoverable if they are "relevant to an issue of
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which
that condition is an element of any claim or defense." Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); se<e Utah
Code Ann. §§ 58-60-114(2)(b), 58-60-509(2)(b), 58-60-510, 58-61-602(2)(b) (2008).
In State v. Worthed 2009 UT 79, 222 P.3d 1144, the Utah Supreme Court relied
on existing law to set forth a three-step process for discovering mental health files.
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Under the first step, a defendant must allege that the "witnesses] mental or emotional
condition itself is an element of any claim or defense." I<L at \ 19 (relying on Rule 506);
see also id^ at ^ 35. According to the court, a mental or an emotional "condition" is a
"state that persists over time and significantly affects a person's perceptions, behavior, or
decision making in a way that is relevant to the reliability of the person's testimony." IcL
at If 21 (a witness's mental or emotional health may qualify as a "condition" even if there
is no formal diagnosis for an illness or disorder). In addition, an "element" of a defense
is any argument that "interjects doubts into the State's obligation to prove every element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." IdL at ^ 30 (agreeing with the court of
appeals' interpretation). Thus, in order for a condition to qualify as an element of a claim
or a defense, it must persist over time and be a factor in the defense. See_ id^ atfflf21, 3031,35. For example, a condition is relevant to an element of a defense if the defendant
claims the following: "CI didn't do it,'" and the victim was motivated, influenced, or
otherwise affected by a persisting mental condition to fabricate or exaggerate allegations
of criminal conduct. See id. at \ 37.
Next, under the second step for discovery of mental health files, the defendant
must show to a "reasonable certainty" that the files exist and they contain exculpatory
evidence, which would be favorable to the defense. IcL at Tflf 15, 38 (relying on State v.
Blake, 2002 UT 113,ffi[19-20, 63 P.3d 56; Cardall 1999 UT 51, % 30). According to the
court, this step is "'stringent,'" "'necessarily requiring some type of extrinsic indication
that the evidence within the [documents] exists and will, in fact, be exculpatory.'" Id. at \
33

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38 (citation and footnote omitted). The defendant may "point to information from
outside sources suggesting [the witness] . . . has a history of mental illness relevant to
[her] ability to accurately report on the assault." Blake, 2002 UT 113, \ 21. The second
step may be satisfied if the person seeking discovery of the files alleges specific facts,
including,
references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are alleged to be
relevant, independent allegations made by others that a victim has recanted, or
extrinsic evidence of some disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding a
victim's trustworthiness.
Worthed 2009 UT 79, \ 41 (citing Blake, 2002 UT 113, \ 22; emphasis added). If the
defendant is able to present"'specific facts justifying the review,5" the facts will support
the "reasonable certainty test." IcL (citation omitted).
And finally, the third step for discovery of mental health files is triggered if the
defendant has satisfied the first two steps. That is, if the defendant has shown, first, that
the witness's mental or emotional condition is an element of a claim or defense, and
second, that there is a reasonable certainty that the documents contain exculpatory
evidence, then under the third step, the trial court must engage in an in camera review of
the mental health files for materiality. IdL at Yh 14-15; see also State v. Gonzales, 2005
UT 72,ffi[44-45, 125 P.3d 878; Cardall, 1999 UT 51, f 32 ("A defendant has no
constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files"). Mental health files
are material for purposes of discovery if they contain independently probative
information relevant to the defense. See, e.g., Worthen, 2009 UT 79,ffif49, 50. In
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addition, they are material if they contain information cumulative to the defense:
cumulative information may be probative and relevant for independent purposes, or it
may be "of a better quality" than evidence currently available to the defendant and
therefore material in its own right. Se^e id. atfflf49, 50. The defendant is not required to
prove materiality; rather, the trial court must determine materiality in connection with an
in camera review of the files. See_ id_ at ^ 43, 48.
In State v. Worthen, the trial court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court
each upheld discovery of a witness's mental health files. 2009 UT 79. According to the
facts, the State placed B.W. in the Worthens' home to live after she had been abused by
her biological parents. IcL at f 3. The Worthens later adopted B.W., and in July 2005,
she was argumentative and attempted suicide. IcL The Worthens placed her in an
inpatient neuropsychiatric program, and she kept a journal describing her anger toward
her adoptive mother. Id, atffl[3-4. In addition, she alleged that her adoptive father, the
defendant, sexually abused her. IcL at | 5. As a result of the allegations, the State
charged the defendant with ten counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. IcL at *f 1.
During pretrial discovery, the defendant requested copies of B.W.'s mental health files.
IcL at ^f 7. The files were discoverable where the victim "harbored extreme hatred
towards her parents, which created a motive to fabricate allegations of abuse so that she
would be removed from her parents' home." IcL at ^ 37, 40. In addition, the defendant
requested specific documents relating to B.W.'s "cognitive problems and propensity for
misinterpretation." LL at \ 42. Since the request for the files was sufficient, the
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defendant was entitled to have the trial court review them for materiality. Id. at *H43, 56.
Likewise, in State v. CardalL 1999 UT 51, the supreme court upheld discovery of
the victim's mental health records. In that case, the State charged the defendant with rape
of a child. The defendant requested in camera review of an "anxiety exam" administered
at the school and documents regarding the victim's allegations of abuse against a school
janitor. M at \ 10. The defendant claimed the documents related to his defense that the
victim was "a habitual liar, that she fabricated her story about [the current crime], that she
[was] mentally and emotionally unstable, and that the records show that on at least one
previous occasion these psychological traits led her to lie" about a previous similar crime.
Id_ at \ 29. The supreme court ruled the information could be reviewed. Id. ^ 33, 35. It
remanded the case for further proceedings. IdL at ^ 35; see also Wgrthen, 2009 UT 79, ^
23 (stating the "psychological traits" at issue in Cardall - habitual liar, fabricator, and
mentally and emotionally unstable - satisfied the standard for in camera review, but each
trait "alone" would not be sufficient to establish an emotional condition).
On remand, the trial court would assess the documents for materiality, and
determine whether information contained in the documents "probably would have
changed the outcome" of the defendant's case. CardalL 1999 UT 51, ^f 35. The above
principles apply to the discovery of Westphal's mental health files.
(2) Westphal Has Been Diagnosed with Mental Illnesses and Is an Admitted
Alcoholic and Drug Abuser: Those Conditions Are Relevant to King's Defense.
Westphal's mental or emotional condition was an element of a claim or an element
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of King's defense. As stated above, defense counsel obtained information prior to trial
concerning Westphal's history with mental illness and drug abuse. See_ supra, Arg.
A.(l)(a). Westphal had been diagnosed with mental illnesses and drug-induced
psychoses, and she had relied on those diagnoses to apply for and receive a disability
payment from Social Security. See Addendum C,ffi[2, 4, 5. Westphal's mental illnesses
and her history with drugs qualified as a mental or emotional condition under Rule
506(2)(b). See Addendum B,fflf6-9 (the expert, Dr. Hanson, would have been available
to advise counsel and the court that methamphetamine-induced psychoses and drug
addiction are mental illnesses with long-term effects on a person's ability to accurately
perceive, recall and recount events); see also Worthen, 2009 UT 79,ffif21, 30-31, 35 (a
condition qualifies as an element of a claim or a defense if it persists over time and has an
effect or influence on a factor relevant to the defense).
In addition, Westphal's mental condition qualified as an element of a claim or a
defense where the State relied on Westphal's perceptions of events for the prosecution.
Indeed, the State relied on Westphal's version of events to shape the pretrial
investigation. SeeR. 1A (Westphal's statements). And it relied on Westphal's testimony
to implicate King in criminal conduct. See supra, Arg. A.(l)(a).
Likewise, Westphal's condition constituted an element of a defense where
evidence supports that King did not assault or kidnap Westphal and Westphal was

3

Juarez provided direct evidence to support that King did not assault or kidnap Westphal. She testified as follows. King did not use drugs on September 25, 2008. R.
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influenced or impaired in her perceptions by long-term mental health conditions. See
Addendum C, Iffi 2-3 (defense counsel was aware of Westphal's conditions); Addendum
B, W 10-14 (a person with Westphal's conditions likely would be impaired in her
perceptions). The record supports the first step in discovering the mental health files. See
Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); Worthen, 2009 UT 79,ffij21, 30, 37; see also Addendum C,
Exhibit 1 at 15 (Westphal thought "Joe" had something to do with the events).
Next, given the information available to counsel in pretrial proceedings, King's
attorney should have demonstrated with reasonable certainty that specific information
from Valley Mental Health: Safe Haven and Salt Lake Valley Store Front existed and
supported Westphal's heavy drug use and impaired cognitive processes. Specifically,
defense counsel knew that Safe Haven and Store Front were both substance abuse
treatment centers and Westphal received treatment for her drug addictions and mental

151:93, 127. Juarez placed the cord around Westphal's neck because the cord belonged
to Westphal. R. 151:97-98. Juarez encouraged Westphal to go with them to the
apartment, and King did not want Westphal there, although she could get her clothes. R.
151:109, 117, 134, 173; see also R. 152:127. King did not force Westphal into a cab. R.
151:110-11. King gave Westphal a knife at the apartment to clean her nails and he gave
her clean clothes to wear because she was filthy. R. 151:111-12, 134, 144-45, 166; see
also R. 152:115. The three of them talked, drank, and argued about issues at the
apartment. R. 151:114, 148. No one threatened Westphal with a knife. R. 151:142.
King made a gesture at Westphal with a cigarette but did not touch or burn her. R.
151:117. King did not threaten Westphal. R. 151:115-16. Juarez might have told
Westphal they would take her to the bank in the morning for money but Juarez was
drank. R. 151:122. King did not tape Westphal, he did not direct Juarez to tape
Westphal, and he did not threaten Westphal; also, Juarez taped Westphal and she acted
alone. R. 151:115, 119-20, 121, 153-54, 181-82, 185-86.
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illnesses at the facilities in 2008. Addendum C,fflf2-4. In addition, Westphal received a
diagnosis for methamphetamine-induced psychoses and she made an application to Social
Security in 2007 or 2008 for a large disability payment due to her mental health issues.
See id. at ^ 2, 4. In that regard, the record "point[s] to information from outside
sources" suggesting that Westphal "has a history of [drug use and diagnosed] mental
illness[es]," which would be "relevant to [her] ability to accurately report on the assault."
Blake* 2002 UT 113, If 21; see Addendum B,ffif6-9. King maintains the mental health
files exist and contain extrinsic evidence of drug use and mental disorders which affect
Westphal5s credibility as a witness, where her disorders are long term and they
significantly affect her ability to accurately perceive, remember or recount events. See,
e.g. Addendum B, Tffl 6-13.
Under the circumstances, defense counsel should have presented sufficient
information to satisfy the second step in discovering the mental health files. See
Worthen, 2009 UT 79, If 41 (under the "reasonable certainty" test, "'extrinsic evidence of
some disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding'" a witness's credibility will
support discovery of mental health documents) (citation omitted). The information
would have triggered the third step: in camera review of the files for materiality. IdL at Yi
15, 43 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court did not reach the third step because
defense counsel was deficient in requesting discovery of the files.
(3) Defense Counsel Made a Deficient Request for the Mental Health Records.
King's attorney made an inadequate request for the mental health files in pretrial
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discovery. Specifically, the record shows that on March 11, 2009, defense counsel
requested that the trial court compel Valley Mental Health to produce documents relatmg
to Westphal for in camera review. R. 30-31. On March 18, 2009, defense counsel
amended the request and asked for documents from "the Storefront and Safe Haven
programs." R. 33-34.4 Counsel did not indicate that the documents were discoverable
under an exception to the privilege at Rule 506, set? R. 30-31, 33-34; in addition, counsel
did not indicate that the documents would contain exculpatory evidence "of some
disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding" Westphal's credibility. Blake, 2002
UT 113422.
On April 24, 2009, the trial court advised defense counsel that his request for
mental health files was inadequate under Utah law. R. 148:4. The court asked defense
counsel to "brief the issues and it set a briefing schedule. R. 148:6-7. Thereafter,
defense counsel withdrew his requests for the documents because he believed he could
not "meet the admissibility requirements regarding the alleged victims medical and bank
records" for purposes of discovery under the law. R. 67.
Where the mental health files should have been discoverable under the law, and
the information was relevant to the defense, supra, Arg. B.(2), defense counsel's failure
to make an adequate request for the records constitutes deficient performance. Gordon,
4

On March 30, 2009, defense counsel requested documents relating to Westphal's
treatment for "[c]ourt-ordered probation," documents from a podiatrist, and documents
from Wells Fargo Bank. R. 50-51. Defense counsel stated the documents related to
Westphal's drug use, mental state, and credibility. R. 51.
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913 P.2d at 356 ("'a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical
decision'") (citation omitted). The mental health documents should have been pursued as
part of defense counsel's investigation to "set[] the foundation for counsel's strategic
decisions about how to build the best defense." Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 69. They would
have assisted in establishing Westphal's mental condition, and the influences on her
perceptions and her cognitive processes and functions. See Addendum B, % 18; Worthen,
2009 UT 79, TJ 21 (a mental or emotional condition persists over time and affects "a
person's perceptions, behavior, or decision making in a way that is relevant to the
reliability of the person's testimony"). Since defense counsel was ineffective in
discovering the mental health files, this Court may remand this case so that the trial court
may supplement the record on appeal with mental health files in order that King may
have an adequate record of the issues for appeal.
C. COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE RESULTED IN PREJUDICE.
The first step of the Strickland test is satisfied: King's attorney provided ineffective assistance when he failed to investigate facts relevant to the defense. Templin, 805
P.2d at 188; see also Addendum C, ^f 10; supra Args. A.(l) and B. A proper investigation would have allowed King's attorney to make informed and professional choices
about the case. It would have allowed counsel to make "strategic decisions about how to
build the best defense." Hales* 2007 UT 14, \ 69. For example, if King's attorney had
engaged in a proper investigation, he would have discovered evidence to present through
an expert, who was available to discuss how mental illness and drug abuse affect a
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person's ability to accurately perceive reality, and to recall and recount events. See
supra, Arg. A.(2). Since King's attorney failed to investigate, he failed to make
reasonable decisions about presenting King's defense. See Crestani, 111 P.2d at 1090
(counsel can make informed choices after engaging in a reasonable investigation).
The second step of the test assesses whether '"there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the [jury] would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'"
Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 86 (footnote omitted). Under the second step, the court balances
the gravity of the legal error against the State's evidence. The Utah Supreme Court
stated, "Because '[s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had
an isolated trivial effect,' in determining the effect of the error, we 'consider the totality
of the evidence before the . .. jury.'" Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 86 (footnote omitted).
To that end, Utah courts have ruled that error is prejudicial in cases where
evidence is in conflict or susceptible to different interpretations. In Hales, the pivotal
issue at trial concerned an expert's interpretation of CT scans. "Based on the CT scans
and other medical evidence regarding retinal hemorrhaging," the State's expert, Dr.
Walker, concluded that the victim was shaken and suffered a non-accidental injury
resulting ultimately in death. LL at ^J 77. In addition, the State's expert was the only
witness to anchor his opinions regarding the cause and the timing of the victim's injuries
to the defendant for the conviction. LL at U 89. Since the State's evidence going to the
CT scans was pivotal, the court ruled that the defendant's attorneys provided ineffective
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assistance when they failed to challenge the evidence with their own expert; indeed, a
defense expert was available and would have given the jury a competing interpretation of
the CT scans for the jury's assessment. I(L at \ 91. In addition, the "competing
interpretation would have likely cast doubt" on the State's theory focused on the
defendant. LL Thus, under the circumstances, the failure to investigate the issues and to
retain an expert was prejudicial. IcL at \ 92 (where the State's case hinged on the expert's
interpretation, and an alternative interpretation existed to raise a reasonable doubt, the
prejudice standard is met).
In Templin, the defendant was charged with rape. 805 P.2d at 183. After
conviction, he filed a motion and then appealed, arguing that counsel failed to investigate
witnesses who would testify that the defendant and victim were affectionate prior to the
alleged rape. M at 185. The Utah Supreme Court considered the uninvestigated
testimony to be relevant in assessing whether the victim later consented to sex: "The
testimony of these witnesses, though not completely consistent with [defendant's]
testimony, contradicted several aspects of [the victim's] testimony" regarding
nonconsensual sexual activity. IcL at 185. The evidence would have reflected on the
"credibility of the only witness who gave direct evidence of defendant's guilt"; it would
have affected the "'.entire evidentiary picture.'" M at 188 (footnote omitted). Consequently, defense counsel's failure to investigate resulted in prejudice. IcL at 188-89.
In this case, if counsel had engaged in a proper investigation for King's defense,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome since the information that defense
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counsel failed to explore was pivotal to the prosecution and the defense. Specifically, a
proper investigation into Westphal's mental and emotional condition would raise
significant questions about her ability to accurately perceive and respond to events. At
trial, Westphal acknowledged mental illness diagnoses and a diagnosis for psychoses.
See R. 152:5, 6. She used methamphetamine for years, R. 152:52, 54-56, and described
herself as a drug addict and alcoholic. R. 152:53, 56-57, 88. For a period of time before
September 25, 2008, Westphal spent an unspecified amount of money on an unknown
quantity of crack cocaine. R. 152:49, 52, 58-60, 77. In addition, on September 25, she
withdrew money from the bank and spent it or gave it away, R. 152:62; and she smoked
crack cocaine and shared vodka with others. R. 152:14-15, 38, 77. Westphal testified
she currently uses drugs if she slips up. R. 152:56-57. And she smoked crack cocaine
within a month or two of trial. R. 152:57, 107; see also Addendum B,ffl[10-13.
Westphal demonstrated and revealed facts supporting impaired cognitive processes and
functions. See_ supra, Arg. A.(2) and B; see also Addendum B.
Nevertheless, the State relied on Westphal's perceptions to implicate King in
crime. According to Westphal, on September 25, King directed Juarez to place a cord
around her throat as the initial aggressive act at Pioneer Park, R. 152:16; he provoked a
woman named Alaska to assault her at the park, R. 152:18; he hit her, threatened her with
a knife, and threatened her life, R. 152:22, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33; he directed her to get into a
cab at knife point, R. 152:71, 72, 81; he threatened to take her to the bank in the morning
to withdraw money from her account, R. 152:28-29, 34; he directed Juarez to put tape on
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Westphal's wrists and ankles at the apartment, R. 152:30-32; and he forced alcohol down
Westphal's throat. IcL Notably, the State presented no physical evidence linking King to
crime: the investigating officers failed to confiscate the cord that was placed around
Westphal's neck, R. 152:142-43; they failed to confirm that King used a knife they
retrieved from the apartment, see, e.g., R. 152:66 (Westphal was unable to identify the
knife); they were unable to obtain useable fingerprint evidence, R. 152:121; and
Westphal had no visible bruises or marks as a result of the alleged events. See
Addendum C, Ex. 1 at 43-44.
Where the State relied on Westphal's testimony to implicate King in crime, it also
presented conflicting evidence. Specifically, Juarez testified that King did not assault
Westphal, see R. 151:116, 161; he did not threaten her, R. 151: 110-11, 115-16, 142; he
did not bind her with tape; and he did not direct Juarez to bind Westphal. See R. 151:
115, 119-20, 121, 153-54, 181-82, 185-86: see also supra, footnote 3 herein. But see R.
152:132-34 (Detective Gordon testified that she bluffed Juarez and used deceptive tactics
to obtain statements). Rather, Juarez put the tape on Westphal. R. 151:119-22.
Given the conflicts in the evidence and the centrality of Westphal's perceptions, it
should have been evident to defense counsel that an investigation into Westphal's mental
condition was necessary. Yet King's attorney did not investigate the issues or develop a
strategy for presenting relevant information to the jury. Instead he relied on Westphal's
cross-examination. See Addendum C, ^f 10. Yet Westphal was not qualified to address
how her mental illnesses and drug use affected her perceptions. See. R. 152:54. In
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addition, her cross-examination did not shed light on how mental illness and drugs use
influenced her ability to accurately perceive, recall, and recount events. See Addendum
B, *h 16 (Westphal was likely unaware of her own impaired processes); see also Hales,
2007 UT 14, ^ 90 (defense counsel called a forensic pathologist and attempted to undermine the State's evidence by asking questions about the CT scans on cross-examination).
The decision not to investigate was unreasonable and unprofessional. In addition,
an attorney providing reasonable professional assistance would have presented the
defense, since evidence that Westphal was impaired in her perceptions would have
altered the entire evidentiary picture. If counsel had investigated and presented the
defense, see supra, Arg. A. and B., the information would have raised doubts about the
State's case. See_ Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 91 (evidence of a competing theory would cast
doubt on the State's case). Additionally, "it is relevant that [Dr. Hanson's] affidavit
further indicates that other crucial portions" of Westphal's testimony was susceptible to
attack by a qualified expert. Id:, see_ Addendum B, ^ 15-17.
Because the State's case hinged on Westphal's perceptions and interpretations, the
jury likely would have been swayed by a proper investigation and a defense shedding
light on how Westphal's perceptions were impaired. Sew Addendum B. There is a
reasonable probability that the proper investigation and defense would have "raise[d] a
reasonable doubt as to [defendant's] guilt." Hales, 2007 UT 14, | 92.
CONCLUSION
King is able to satisfy both parts of Strickland with the supplemental facts set forth
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in the Affidavits of Glen R. Hanson, Ph.D., D.D.S., and Manny Garcia. Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association has interviewed each witness, and ascertained their availability and
testimony as set forth in the attached affidavits pursuant to Johnston, 2000 UT App 290.
Inasmuch as the affidavits support the determination that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance, they are pivotal to King's claims on appeal. On that basis, and for
the additional reasons set forth herein, King respectfully requests that this Court remand
this case to the trial court for supplementation of the record on appeal with the mental
health files and evidence from Dr. Hanson.
DATED THIS J g t day of July, 2010.

/!

LIND^A M. JONES "' T
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused a copy of the foregoing to
be hand delivered to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160
East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this V5 day of July, 2010.

DELIVERED this i^

day of July, 2010.
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